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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article is to sketch in a rather cursory man-
ner first, the most fundamental and basic claims underlying the 
current efforts to establish a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO), second, the critical role of transnational corporations in 
the global wealth process which is perceived as either directly or 
indirectly affecting the realization of those claims, and third, to 
point out the subtle but pervasive influence of legal concepts, doc-
trines, and the practice of classical international law, viewed by the 
claimants as contributing to the status quo, and consequently a 
major impediment to the realization of those claims. This article 
does not purport to examine systematically, or even analyze any of 
these three interrelated topics, but only to indicate the problems 
involved and the magnitude of the task confronting the interna-
tional community called upon to establish appropriate global eco-
nomic policies. Such a broad canvass is necessary for a proper ap-
praisal of the many important and striking observations in the re-
cent international arbitral award, Texaco Overseas Petroleum Com-
pany /California Asiatic Oil Company v. Libyan Arab Republic, 1 the 
first international decision purporting to examine the status of the 
NIEO as evidence of emerging customary international law. 
The incessant demands for radical changes in the existing sys-
tem of world public order is perhaps the most conspicuous feature 
of contemporary international relations. 2 Much of that concerted 
effort channelled through the United Nations-whether it is in the 
• Professor of Law, Queen's University, Canada. B.Sc. (1953), M.L. (1958), Andhra 
University; LL.M. Stanford University (1963); J.S.D. Yale University (1967). This article is 
a revised and expanded version of a paper presented at a symposium on the subject organized 
by the Syracuse University College of Law in 1978. 
1. Award on the Merits in the Dispute Between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Com-
pany /California Asiatic Oil Company and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 
reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Libya-Oil Companies Arbi-
tration]. 
2. See R. FALK, A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS (1975); J. TINBERGEN, RESHAPING THE INTER-
NATIONAL ORDER: A REPORT TO THE CLUB OF ROME ( 1976). For a persuasive account of the global 
economic issues pertaining to world public order, see J. BHAGWATI, ECONOMICS AND WORLD 
ORDER FROM THE 1970's TO THE 1990's (1974); Falk, The World Order Models Project and Its 
Critics: A Reply, 32 INT'L ORGANIZATION 531 (1978). 
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area of human rights, economic development, or international peace 
and security-is aimed at achieving changes through peaceful 
means. No perceptive observer of the contemporary international 
scene can fail to notice how, within a short period of three decades, 
perspectives of authority and control conditioning the global order 
have been dramatically altered in many areas of international con-
cern. Decolonization, detente, and development have become, dur-
ing these three decades, the benchmarks of history and conse-
quently remained the major preoccupation of the United Nations. 
These developments have their impact on the substantive con-
tent of international law as well. Despite growing awareness of the 
tremendous interdependencies conditioning the choices available to 
people everywhere, the global community, still operating on the 
basis of the outmoded nation-state system and suddenly exposed to 
the task of facing problems that have defied effective management 
on such a basis, presently is confronted with a challenge to devise 
new structures for collaboration and new inclusive policies for co-
operation, which are capable of nurturing perceived interdepen-
dencies.3 The present efforts to establish a NIEO deserve to be ap-
praised from this general global perspective. 
The call for a new international order, an order that is more 
responsive to the global needs and human dignity, particularly to 
the needs of development, has in many ways begun to affect the 
foundations of international law on which existing international 
order has traditionally found its authority. 4 The traditional prem-
ises of state sovereignty by reference to which the normative pro-
cesses at the international level are usually explained were thus 
suddenly exposed to the emerging patterns of interdependence, and 
to the felt needs for cooperation based on criteria other than those 
3. E. LUARD, INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES: THE EMERGING FRAMEWORK OF INTERDEPENDENCE 
189-90 (1977); Macdonald, Johnston, & Morris, The International Law of Human Welfare: 
Concept, Experience, and Priorities in THE INTERNATIONAL LAw AND POLICY OF HUMAN 
WELFARE 3-79 (R. Macdonald, D. Johnston, & G. Morris ed. 1978); Falk, The Domains of Law 
and Justice, 31 INT'L J. 1 (1976). In this respect attention should be drawn to the larger and 
more fundamental issues linking the minimum standards of treatment for aliens with the 
emerging international human rights prescriptions. For further discussion, see McDougal, 
Lasswell, & Chen, The Protection of Aliens From Discrimination and World Public Order: 
Responsibility of States Conjoined with Human Rights, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 432 (1976). 
4. 0. SCHACHTER, SHARING THE WORLD'S RESOURCES 53-55 (1977); Schachter, The Evolv-
ing International Law of Development, 15 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1976). Cf. R. TUCKER, 
THE INEQUALITY OF NATIONS (1977); Johnston, The Foundations of Justice in International 
Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 111 (R. Macdonald, D. 
Johnston, & G. Morris ed. 1978); Rothstein, Inequality, Exploitation, and Justice in the 
International System: Reconciling Divergent Expectations, 21 INT'L STUD. Q. 319 (1977). 
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narrow individualistic notions of absolute sovereignty .5 Interna-
tional lawyers, accustomed to using conceptions of law as legitimiz-
ing factors only after changes are well in place, may find it difficult 
to rationalize and clarify the purport of the new claims, such as 
those designed to establish a NIEO, and rush to the conclusion that 
such claims are in violation of the substantive doctrines of interna-
tional law. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that some of the 
most vocal, and admittedly conservative, objections to the formu-
lated objectives of the NIEO, are made in the name of international 
law.8 
5. See E. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS (1964); Falk, The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of the 
International Legal Order, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 32 (R. Falk 
& R. Black ed. 1969); Falk, The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International 
Law-Gaps in Legal Thinking, 50 VA. L. REv. 231 (1964); Falk, Historical Tendencies Mod-
ernizing and Revolutionary Nations, and the International Legal Order, 8 Hou. L.J. 128 
(1962). 
6. For discussion and identification of the basic issues, see J. SINGH, A NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: TOWARD A FAIR REDISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD'S RESOURCES (1977); 
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (E. Laszlo, R. Baker, E. Eisen-
berg, & v. Raman ed. 1978); THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: CONFRONTATION OR 
Co-OPERATION BETWEEN NORTH AND Soum? (K. Sauvant & H. Hasenpflug ed. 1977). 
For a useful historical account of the emergence of the NIEO debates in the United 
Nations, see Asante, International Transactions and National Development Goals, 4 GHANA 
C1v. SERVICE J. 1 (1977); Gosovic & Ruggie, On the Creation of a New International Economic 
Order: Issue Linkage and the Seventh Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, 30 INT'L 
ORGANIZATION 309 (1976); Rozenthal, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
and the New International Economic Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 309 (1976); Tiewal, The U.N. 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 10 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 645 (1975). 
For discussion by some of the most incessant advocates of the view that the NIEO has 
changed the relevant principles of international law, see Adede, International Law and the 
Property of Aliens: The Old Order Changeth, 19 MALAYA L. REV. 175 (1977); Shihata, Arab 
Oil Policies and the New International Economic Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 261 (1976). For 
critical and negative discussion of the NIEO, see lssuEs AND PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (W. Tyler ed. 1977); Hirsch, Is There a New International Economic 
Order?, 30 INT'L ORGANIZATION 521 (1976); Petersmann, International Economic Law and the 
Third World, [1976) ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHE VOLKERRECHT 492. 
For discussion of Western capital exporting nations' objections to the NIEO, see Brower 
& Tepe, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States-A Reflection or Rejection of 
International Law?, 9 INT'L LAW. 295 (1975); Haight, The New International Economic Order 
and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 9 INT'L LAW. 591 (1975); White, A 
New International Economic Order, 24 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 542 (1975); Note, Charter on Eco-
nomic Rights and Duties of States: A Solution to the Development Aid Problem?, 4 GA. J. 
INT'L & COMP. L. 441 (1974). 
It is submitted that these three broadly defined perspectives, which are identified in the 
cited materials above, proceed from a deterministic point of view with little evidence of the 
awareness of the interdependencies that characteristically sustain and call for a global wealth 
process. See Hagen, How Economic Growth Begins: A Theory of Social Change, in 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (P. Kilby ed. 1971). 
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If shared perspectives of authority offered by international law 
have generally served to promote stability and world public order, 
international trade and commerce have historically served to mobi-
lize international relations and to create enduring contacts across 
national frontiers. 7 The underlying policy has been eloquently 
stated by Fred Bergsten: 
For at least 150 years, international economic policies have rested 
on the fundamental concept that the objective of all such policies 
is to maximize the level and growth of international economic trans-
actions by relying on market forces and minimizing barriers to 
them, because this maximizes economic welfare and minimizes pol-
itical conflict. 8 
For a critical review of the NIEO approach and the principles of international law 
involved, see Petersmann, The New International Economic Order-Principles, Politics, and 
International Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 449 (R. Mac-
donald, D. Johnston, & G. Morris ed. 1978). 
7. See c. SCHMITHOFF, THE SOURCES OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 70 (1964); Darja, 
The Role of Law and Economic Inequalities Among Nations, 2 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 276 (1961); 
Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups and the Law, 57 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 155 (1957); Schwarzenberger, Equality and Discrimination in International Economic 
Law, [1971) Y.B. WORLD AFF. 163; Schwarzenberger, The Principles and Standards of Inter-
national Economic Law, 117 RECUEIL DES CouRs 1 (1966). Cf. Lasswell, The Interplay of 
Economic, Political and Social Criteria in Legal Policy, 14 VAND. L. REV. 451 (1961). For a 
comprehensive discussion of the global processes of action, see McDougal, Lasswell, & Reis-
man, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 73 (R. Falk & R. Black ed. 1969). 
8. C. BERGSTEN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: AN AGENDA FOR 
RESEARCH 11 (1973). The critical issue for consideration has been formulated as follows: 
Can a private firm, if it expends time and resources to develop a foreign export 
market, rely upon the stability of the internatfonal rules so that its investment will 
pay satisfactory returns? Could foreign governments quickly change the rules of 
international trade to prevent a firm's export sales to take advantage of its advertis-
ing and goodwill efforts? 
J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS xxi (1977). For a tradi-
tional approach to the legal aspects of foreign trade, see Mann, State Contracts and State 
Responsibility, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 572 (1960), reprinted in F. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 302 (1973). 
The concept of "good faith" is a critical tool facilitating the process of foreign trade. 
[F)reedom of contract is an essential legal mechanism in the operation of a system 
of production based upon laissez-faire capitalism. It denotes a system of economic 
organisation within which the degree of direct state interference in economic matters 
is minimal. 
Martin & Osberg, Producer Cartels, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN 
WELFARE 506-07 (R. Macdonald, D. Johnston, & G. Morris ed. 1978). Such a view is, however, 
seen compatible with the assumption that where the contract is subject to national law, the 
state's authority to intervene is not affected by the mere existence of a contract or treaty. 
No rule of international law has become known which would render it an interna-
tional tort for a State on the level of municipal law to rely on its own legislation. To 
invoke pacta sunt servanda does not help in a case in which by its very nature and 
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With the advent of decolonization, and the sky-rocketing in-
vestments in military expenditures, this liberal laissez-faire ethic 
has given rise to two fundamental questions: (1) whose economic 
welfare is served by that system, and (2) whose policies are affecting 
the economies of the world? In part, because the "market forces" 
are largely, if not exclusively, controlled by the giant multinational 
corporations based in a few wealthy industrialized nations, the poli-
cies governing international trade and commerce have remained 
largely the elusive domain of the invisible private corporate struc-
ture.9 
The efforts to establish a NIEO upon existing structures (which 
are often deeply entrenched) on the basis of present bargaining 
strengths (avowedly unequal in terms of available capital and 
skills), without disturbing present unequal resource distributions 
(cheap raw materials as against the inflated costs of imported man-
ufactures), and fueled by idealogical antagonisms ("free" market 
system vs. publicly planned economics), and other related factors, 
present formidable obstacles to any rational management of the 
global wealth process. 10 No single and easy answers are available for 
resolving all the myriad problems at once, or even the most impor-
tant among them, in a peaceful manner. During the discussions on 
the NIEO proposals the contending groups nevertheless rallied 
around three problem areas: (1) whether the developing countries 
must be assisted to make rapid economic progress; (2) whether the 
the law supporting it the pactum is liable to become subject to new legislation. Nor 
is it possible to suggest a proprietary right in the continued existence of legislation 
rendering the contract immume. 
Mann, The Consequences of an International Wrong in International and Municipal Law, 48 
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 58 n.1 (1976-1977). 
It appears that both of these views offer rather narrow conceptions, both of the law of 
international contracts, and the effect of general principles of international law on the contin-
ued performance of such contractual commitments. 
9. Transnational Corporations in World Development Re-examined, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.10/38 (1978); New Directions and New Structures for Trade and Development, UNC-
TAD Report, U.N. Doc. TD/183/Rev. 1 (1977); Lall, Developing Countries and Multinational 
Corporations-Effect on Host Countries' Welfare and the Role of Government Policy, 
COMMONWEALTH ECONOMIC PAPER No. 5 (1976); Wells, The Multinational Business Enterprise: 
What Kind of International Organization?, 25 INT'L ORGANIZATION 447 (1971). Cf. Asante, 
supra note 6; Dunning, Multinational Enterprises, Market Structure, Economic Power and 
Industrial Policy, 8 J. WORLD TRADE L. 575 (1974). 
10. For discussion identifying the legal problems, see Mikdashi, Influencing the Environ-
ment for Primary Commodities, 8 J. WORLD TRADE L. 144 (1974); Petersmann, The New 
International Economic Order-Principles, Politics, and International Law, in THE INTERNA· 
TIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 449 (R. Macdonald, D. Johnston, & G. Morris 
ed. 1978). 
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role of transnational enterprises must be regulated to enable the 
developing countries to realize the full value of their wealth; and (3) 
whether the scope of the norms and concepts of international law 
as incidents of the recognized right of states to exercise full perma-
nent sovereignty over their natural resources must reflect appropri-
ately the national practice, policies, and the domestic procedures 
relevant thereunder .11 
II. THE CONTEXT OF THE CLAIM TO ESTABLISH A NEW 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 
The rapid success of the process of decolonization in the post 
World War II period has failed to fulfill many of the sanguine expec-
tations it has generated in the newly independent nations of a more 
equitable international economic order .12 This is largely because the 
structures envisaged to bring recovery to the war-ravaged economies 
of the industrialized countries proved insufficient, and in fact, were 
unable to cope with the needs and special conditions of the develop-
ing countries. 13 Poverty, underdevelopment, and economic depend-
ence on metropolitan countries presented many urgent issues for the 
Third World, pointing out the inadequacy of targets set, and the 
problems in the way of realizing the objectives of the Second United 
Nations Development Decade. 14 The developing countries realized 
11. These three issues are identified not only because they are germane to the present 
discussion directly, but they in tum embrace a cluster of other issues treated separately in 
the NIEO declarations which raise important legal questions. For current NIEO efforts, see 
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (E. Laszlo, R. Baker, E. Eisen-
berg, & V. Raman ed. 1978). 
12. R. VON ALBERTINI, DEKOLONISATION (1966); Suzuki, Self-Determination and World 
Public Order: Community Response to Territorial Separation, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 779 (1976). 
For a discussion of the social consequences of global power changes, see H. CANTRIL, THE 
PATTERN OF HUMAN CONCERNS (1965). 
13. See generally J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATI 750-62 (1969); C. 
ScHMITHOFF, supra note 7; Espiell, GATT: Accomodating Generalized Preferences, 8 J. 
WORLD TRADE L. 341 (1974); Stern, Tariffs and Other Measures of Trade Control-A Survey 
of Recent Developments, 11 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 857 (1973). 
14. G.A. Res. 2626, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 39, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). See 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: Trade and Development Issues in 
the Context of a New International Economic Order, U.N. Doc. OSG/1041/Rev. 1 (1976), 
reprinted in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: CONFRONTATION OR Co-OPERATION 
BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH? 40-62 (K. Sauvant & H. Hasenpflug ed. 1977); United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development: Mid-term Review and Appraisal of the Implementa-
tion of the Joint Development Strategy, U.N. Doc. TD/B/535 (1974); Report of the Group of 
Experts on the Structure of the United Nations System, A New United Nations Structure 
for Global Economic Co-operation, U.N. Doc. El AC 62/9 (1975); BARKER, BREAKTHROUGH TO 
TOMORROW: THE STORY OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE 
UNITED NATIONS (U.N. Sales No. E.71:5); R. PREBISCH, TOWARDS A GLOBAL STRATEGY OF 
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that the framework of the existing international economic order 
would have to be purposefully broadened to embrace 
"development," and the mechanisms and structures of the existing 
order appropriately changed to meet the new demands. 15 Thus, in 
Resolution 3362 (S-VII) adopted by the General Assembly in the 
autumn of 1975, the purpose of NIEO is stated to cover "political 
and other implications of the state of world development and inter-
national economic co-operation, expanding the dimensions and con-
cepts of economic and developmental co-operation and giving the 
goal of development its rightful place in the United Nations system 
and on the international stage. " 18 
Several years before the adoption of this mandate the develop-
ing countries began to identify the central issues calling for con-
certed action. At the United Conference on Trade and Development 
held in Mexico in 1972, UNCTAD III, the decision was made to 
elaborate a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, and 
a working group was organized under the auspices of UN CT AD that 
began drafting the Charter. 17 In 1973 the Algiers Conference of Non-
Alligned Countries, which was the precursor to the Sixth Special 
Session of the General Assembly, was held and called for self-reliant 
action in the area of natural resources. 18 The 1973 economic declara-
tion produced at the Algiers Conference was in turn built upon 
earlier General Assembly Resolutions on permanent sovereignty, on 
the 15 principles adopted in 1964 at UNCTAD-1, on the principles 
agreed upon at the ministerial meetings of the Group of 77 in Algiers 
DEVELOPMENT (1967). See also Report of the UNCTAD Secretariat, Manufacturers and Semi-
Manufacturers-The Dimensions of the Required Restructuring of World Manufacturing 
Output and Trade in Order to Reach the Lima Target, U.N. Doc. TD/185/Supp. 1 (1976). 
15. See Report by the Secretary-General, New Directions and New Structures for Trade 
and Development, U.N. Doc. TD/183/Rev. 1 (1977); Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, 
Economic Co-operation Among Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. TD/192 (1975); R. 
PREBISCH, supra note 14; Amin, Self-Reliance and the New International Economic 'Urder, 
29 MONTHLY REV. 1 (1977); Wionczek, What Do the Developing Countries Want?, 3 
INTERECONOMICS 76 (1976). 
16. G.A. Res. 3362, Seventh Special Sess., U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/10301 (1975). 
17. UNCTAD Res. 45 (Ill), UNCTAD Proceedings, Third Sess., U.N. Doc. TD/180, 
at 58 (1972). For a discussion of the history of the drafting and adoption of the Charter, see 
Brower & Tepe, supra note 6, at 296-300. 
18. Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, (Al-
giers, Sept. 5-9, 1973) Economic Declaration, at 10, 11, quoted in Haight, supra note 6, at 
591. See also Report of the Ministerial Meeting of the Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, U.N. 
Doc. A/32/74 (1977); The Manila Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. TD/195 
(1976); Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, U.N. 
Doc. NAC/Conf. 5/S./3 (1976). 
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in 1967, in Lima in 1971, and on the resolutions of UNCTAD-11. 111 
The call for a NIEO was identified with the larger needs of the 
developing countries to regain the right to the exercise of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources as well as to establish their na-
tional control over private foreign investment.20 
It is in the backdrop of all this activity, and based on a variety 
of principles and measures elaborated in UNCTAD in previous 
years, that the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly was 
convened. Initially, the General Assembly intended to address itself 
only to raw materials and development, but ultimately, it produced 
a comprehensive Declaration21 and Programme of Action on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order. 22 
No other major issue in contemporary international relations 
has produced so much acrimonious debate. None of the demands 
contained in the resolutions and proposals adopted by consensus 
during the Sixth Special Session presented really new issues; what 
was new was their tone and the terms in which they were presented. 
Nevertheless, four key issues emerged as the major bone of conten-
tion between the Group of 77 and the developed group of countries 
comprising the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD): (1) the scope and meaning of the concept of per-
manent sovereignty, including the anticipated necessity of national-
ization whose validity is to be judged only in accordance with the 
national legislation;23 (2) the mechanisms for regulating interna-
tional trade including the formation of "producer associations"; 24 
19. See Gosovic & Ruggie, supra note 6; Note, The United Nations Seventh Special 
Session: Proposals for a New World Economic Order, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 601, 610 
(1976). 
20. See Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order, G.A. Res. 3202, Sixth Special Sess., U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 
(1974); UNCTAD Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty, U.N. Doc. TD/B/421 (1972); .Con-
ference of Developing Countries on Raw Materials, reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 534 
(1975). 
21. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 
3201, Sixth Special Sess., U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974). 
22. G.A. Res. 3202, Sixth Special Sess., U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 
(1974). 
23. See Adede, supra note 6. 
24. For discussion of the role of cartels and commodity agreements, see E. HEXNER, 
INTERNATIONAL CARTELS (1945); Fawcett, The Function of Law in Commodity Agreements, 44 
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 157 (1970); Walker, The International Law of Commodity Agreements, 
28 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 392 (1963). For a useful analysis of the producer associations 
concept and how it differs from the classic "cartel" mechanism, see Martin & Osberg, 
Producer Cartels: Trade Unions of the Third World, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 
OF HUMAN WELFARE 501 (R. Macdonald, D. Johnston, & G. Morris ed. 1978). For a discussion 
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(3) the criteria for setting commodity prices by establishing a link-
age with the prices of imported manufactured goods, known as 
"indexation";25 and (4) mechanisms for regulating the practices 
of transnational corporations (TNC).26 
During later international conferences, such as the Second 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) 
Session held in Lima in 1975, and UNCTAD IV held in Nairobi in 
1976, the concepts of development aid, technical cooperation among 
the developing countries, "redeployment" of industries, and tech-
nology transfer began to be spelled out in detail. 27 A long-term pro-
gramme concerning raw materials and other primary commodities 
began to be shaped at the Dakar Conference held during February 
1975.28 During the Twenty-ninth Session, the General Assembly by 
a vote of 120 in favour to 6 against, with 10 abstentions, adopted 
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.211 The two 
sides remained sharply divided by the time the General Assembly 
met for the Seventh Special Session.30 
The catalytic effect of the OPEC oil decisions underscored the 
political dimension of the development issues and the motives un-
derlying the solidarity of the developing countries with the oil ex-
of the legal implications of cartel policies, see Metzger, Cartels, Combines, Commodity 
Agreements and International Law, 11 TEX. INT'L L.J. 527 (1976). 
25. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: An Integrated Pro-
gramme for Commodities and Indexation of Prices, U.N. Doc. TD/183 (1976), reprinted in 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: CONFRONTATION OR Co-OPERATION BETWEEN NORTH 
AND SouTH? (K. Sauvant & H. Hasenpflug ed. 1977); Report by the Secretary-General, The 
Indexation of Prices, U.N. Doc. TD/B/503 (1974). The OPEC oil price increase has been 
justified by one commentator on the basis of prices existing in agricultural and manufacturing 
sectors. Amin, The Oil Crisis-An Arab Point of View, 65 L'EGYPTE CoNTEMPORAINE 291, 296 
(1974). 
26. See, e.g., Transnational Corporations: Texts Relevant to an Annotated Outline Su11:-
gested by the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Working Group on the Code of Conduct, 
U.N. Doc. E/C.10/AC. 2/3 (1978); Annual Reports of the Commission on Transnational 
Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/5782 (1977), U.N. Doc. E/C.10/31 (1977), U.N. Doc. E/5986 
(1977); Transnational Corporations: Issues Involved in the Formation of a Code of Conduct, 
U.N. Doc. E/C.10/17 (1977), U.N. Doc. E/C.10/16 (1976); Report of the Group of Eminent 
Persons, the Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International 
Relations, 61 U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev. 1 (ST/ESN6) (1974); Van Dam, Marketing in the New 
International Economic Order, 41 J. MARKETING 19-24 (1977). 
27. UNCTAD Resolution 96, U.N. Doc. TD/217 (1976); United Nations Industrial De-
velopment Organisation: Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial Development 
and Co-operation, U.N. Doc. TD/B/155/Add.l, reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 826 
(1975). 
28. Conference of Developing Countries on Raw Materials, reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL 
MAT'LS 534 (1975). 
29. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). See 
Brower & Tepe, supra note 6. 
30. See Gosovic & Ruggie, supra note 6. 
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porting nations.31 The concerted character of the debate and the 
considerable degree of consensus obtained during the Seventh Spe-
cial Session are largely due to the fact that the agenda did not 
include the controversial items which have plagued the earlier dis-
cussions. International trade, monetary and financial issues, and 
technology matters became the subject of intensive negotiations 
during working committees. The issue of restructuring of the United 
Nations' economic bodies was entrusted to an ad hoc committee. 
III. THE MAJOR OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 
The major task of restructuring the global economic system has 
not been quite so haphazard or dissociated as the varied types of 
conferences convened for that purpose both within and without the 
United Nations might initially appear to suggest. It is true that the 
vast number of the developing countries, over 117, and referred to 
as the Group of 77, voiced. their concerns initially through the 
Dakar, Algiers, and other Non-Aligned Conferences, UNCTAD, 
ECOSOC, the Commonwealth meetings, and in the three Special 
Sessions of the General Assembly specifically arranged for that pur-
pose, in a somewhat declaratory mariner. The communications 
emanating from those conferences are often couched in terms of 
demands for imperative action without any systematic formulation 
of the principles balancing the wide range of rights and duties which 
such an action might entail. 
It must be admitted that, to some extent, this deficiency per-
sisted even when the formulating sessions had the benefit of partici-
pation of competent international lawyers, as was the case with the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. But perhaps in 
line with the activity and pronouncements of the United Nations in 
other fields such as human rights, self-determination, and peace 
and security, the "practice of the United Nations" in the NIEO area 
also carries with it legal authority and significance on the basis of 
its relationship to the provisions of the Charter of the United Na-
tions, a document that is "legally binding" on every Member 
State.32 Moreover, international practice, that omnibus source of all 
31. See Alnasrawi, The Petrodollar Energy Crisis: An Overview and Interpretation, 3 
SvR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 369 (1975); Franko, Multinational Enterprises in the Middle East, 
10 J. WORLD TRADE L. 307 (1976); Mirvahabi, Claims to the Oil Resources in the Persian 
Gulf-Will the World Economy be Controlled by the Gulf in the Future?, 11 TEX. INT'L L.J. 
75 (1976); Shibata, supra note 6. 
32. For such an interpretation of the Charter provisions conferring "initial competence" 
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international law, is not in any sense limited merely to United Na-
tions Resolutions, but includes the actual conduct or the specific 
actions of and agreements made by all those states, the developed 
and the developing, which connote the evolving pattern of global 
economic activity. 
Consequently, in the investigation of the key NIEO issues out-
lined below, the relevant question to be asked is not whether, or to 
what extent, the emerging international law is relevant to each of 
them or plays an important role for achieving the stated objectives. 
Obviously, the legal technique is an indispensible component of any 
intemational effort for achieving agreement, no matter in what spe-
cific form or modality it is evidenced. Rather, my concern is with 
the question of what facilitative opportunities, or functionally rele-
vant impediments, of an international law character which could 
possibly have some effect on the realization of the whole NIEO 
package can be identified, whether they be lex lata, even if not 
specified in these documents, or indicated here as goals to be real-
ized de lege f erenda, even if they remain purely recommendatory in 
character. The specific issue areas examined from this perspective 
may be outlined briefly. 33 
on the organization to promote law-making efforts, even if the latter take the form of 
"recommendations," see Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Con-
tinued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security 
Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16, 57. That the probative value of such pro-
nouncements will be higher when they originate from a body having constitutional compe-
tence appears also implicit in the dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice. Id. at 284. 
There is also concern expressed on the other aspect of this activity, namely, constant 
repetition of the NIEO claims and the impact this may have on perspectives of authority . 
Thus, Gillian White, after stating that "[i]f a proposition lacks normative character, neither 
carelessness by some commentators nor deliberate application of legal terminology by others 
who support the proposition will be likely to confer a normative character on the Charter," 
made the following observation: 
Certainly, the phrase "new international economic order" is becoming commonplace, 
and in so far as its repetition, together with other related resolutions, programs of 
action, and declarations, is capable of affecting the perceptions and opinions of those 
concerned with some aspect of international economic relationships, one may infer 
that a new order is in the process of creation. ' 
White, A New International Economic Order?, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 323, 324 (1976). There is 
concerted effort to ensure through discussion and action adequate implementation of the 
objectives of the NIEO. The Secretary-General recently stated: 
The Assembly also has a special responsibility to ensure that the principles and 
objectives of the New International Economic Order gain increasing acceptance in 
the general thinking and practice of Governments and in public opinion throughout 
the world. 
U.N. Doc. A/32/PV.109, at 8 (1977) . 
33. See THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (E. Laszlo, R. 
Baker, E. Eisenberg, & V. Raman ed. 1978) . 
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A. Financial and Monetary Issues: Foreign Aid and Public Debt 
The Programme of Action34 has spelled out ten interrelated 
objectives of international financial assistance and global liquidity 
for achieving the NIEO goals. They refer to measures for checking 
the adverse effects of inflation in the developed countries from being 
transferred to developing countries; the need to eliminate uncer-
tainty of the exchange rates as it affects trade in commodities, pro-
moting more effective participation of developing countries in the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and other global finan-
cial institutions, and increasing international liquidity to assist the 
needs of the developing countries. However, because the Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) target of 0.7% of the GNP set by 
the Second United Nations Development Decade, 35 remained for all 
practical purposes unfulfilled, the developing countries advanced a 
number of specific proposals concerning foreign aid, foreign invest-
ment, and debt relief, which bear special connotation to the norms 
of international law applicable for determining the scope and con-
tent of the doctrine of international responsibility of states.:u; 
It is to these latter provisions in the NIEO proposals that atten-
tion should be drawn. More specifically, these provisions refer to 
exemption of the developing countries from all import and capital 
outflow controls imposed by the developed countries, promotion of 
public and private foreign investment in accordance with the needs 
and in the sectors of the economies of the developing countries as 
determined by the recipient states, measures to ease the burden of 
external debt contracted on hard terms, and debt renegotiation, 
both as a general concept and on a case-by-case basis, with a view 
to concluding agreements on debt cancellation, moratorium, re-
scheduling, or interest subsidization.37 
34. Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 
G.A. Res. 3202, Sixth Special Sess., U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559, 
reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 720 (1974) . 
35. G.A. Res. 2626, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 39, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). 
36. Money and Finance and Trans,fer of Real Resources for Development, International 
Financial Co-operation for Development, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat [UNCTAD 
IVJ (May 5, 1976) (mimeo only) 16-19, U.N. Doc. TD/188 (1975). See A. FATOUROS, GOVERN-
MENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS (1962); R. POZEN, LEGAL CHOICES FOR STATE ENTER-
PRISES IN THE THIRD WORLD (1976); FOREIGN DEVELOPMENT LENDING (S. Rubin ed. 1971); Hyde, 
Economic Development Agreements, 105 RECUEIL DES CouRs 267 (1962) . For two contrastinF: 
perspectives on the role of private financial agencies, compare Dawson, The Role of the 
Private Banker in the New International Economic Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 297 (1976) with 
Asante, supra note 6. 
37. Adede, Loan Agreements Between Developing Countries and Foreign Commercial 
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Underlying many of these specific demands and other efforts in 
the financial area is the emerging conception of foreign aid and aid 
preferences based on need. Is this entitlement to aid beginning to 
be recognized as an aspect of international responsibility on the part 
of the affluent members of the international society?:111 Such a notion 
appears, whether expressly or implicitly, to be influencing the entire 
range of international decisions pertaining to economic develop-
ment. Referring to the policies followed by OPEC countries in the 
matter of financial assistance to the developing countries adversely 
affected by the increase in OPEC oil prices, Dr. Shibata of Kuwait 
went on record to admit a legal obligation to grant aid as an evolving 
principle of customary international law.39 
As a broad consideration of development policy, the recognition 
on the part of the capital-exporting states of a concept of interna-
tional entitlement of aid is bound to be an important factor in the 
Banks-Reflections on Some Legal and Economic Issues, 5 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 235 (1978); 
Asante, supra note 6 (discussing, in detail, the experience of Ghana with debt rescheduling 
efforts). See also International Monetary Fund: Executive Director's Decision and Instrument 
to Establish a Trust Fund for Balance of Payments Assistance, reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL 
MAT'Ls 953 (1976). For a criticism of the financial aspects of the NIEO, see Kreinin & Finger, 
A Critical Survey of the New International Economic Order, lOJ. WORLD TRADE L. 493 (1976). 
At a meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee of UNCTAD during October, 1978, it 
was agreed to set up a multilateral framework within which debt problems could be dealt 
with more expeditiously. Among the four objectives of international action identified is that 
debt reorganization should enhance the development prospects of the debtor country, bearing 
in mind its socio-economic priorities and developmental objectives. The other criteria agreed 
upon by the Conference are that debt rescheduling should be expeditious and timely; it 
should aim at restoring the debtor country's capacity to serve its debt over both the short 
and the long run and reinforce the developing country's own efforts to strengthen its balance 
of payments position; and it should project the interests of debtors and creditors equitably 
in the context of international economic cooperation. "It was the first time, however, that an 
intergovernmental group had been able to agree that enhancing development prospects of a 
debtor country was a key consideration in debt reorganization." U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, 
Nov.-Dec., 1978, at 171. 
38. Schachter, supra note 4, at 9-13. 
39. From a legal point of view, the impressive aid record of Arab oil-exporting 
countries has two important implications. The first is that the conduct of these States 
contributes to the evolution of new legal rules in the sphere of international economic 
cooperation. For even though contemporary international law does not create a legal 
obligation upon richer states to provide assistance to the less fortunate countries, a 
moral obligation to this effect is gradually hardening into a binding international 
custom. Present aid efforts of Arab oil producing States are accelerating the estab-
lishment of this custom . . . . Elements of the opinio juris, necessary in the conven-
tional theory for completing the custom-making process, may thus be discerned in 
the oil producers' behaviour even at this stage . . . . on account of recent Arab 
practices . . . customary international law has already established an obligation of 
aid-giving in favour of poorer countries. 
Shihata, supra note 6, at 278-79 (footnotes omitted). 
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evolution of the international law of development. The evidence for 
this comes not only from the collective decisions of international 
financial organizations, but more importantly from the specific ac-
tions of the rich countries granting assistance and preferences to 
those severely affected developing countries. As Oscar Schachter 
pointed out: 
This is ... the central feature of the contemporary international 
law of development. When we reflect on it, it may seem extraordi-
nary how we have come to accept it and how far-reaching its impli-
cations may extend. Can we reconcile need as a basis of entitlement 
with other fundamental legal principles such as equality among 
states or their established rights? How can need fit into the still 
prevailing conception of a world market economy based on princi-
ples of comparative advantage and nondiscriminatory trade?40 
Indeed, the policies underlying the decisions in recent years to 
write-off large amounts of public debt of some of the developing 
countries, when examined closely, also appear to apply to the argu-
ments of the developfo.g countries that calculations of "appropriate 
compensation" in the event of nationalization must rest on the 
needs and the abilities of the host state to pay the full market value 
demanded by the concerned foreign corporations. 
Although the present rationale for extending international eco-
nomic assistance is somewhat similar to the notions of the modern 
welfare state, the entitlement of the developing countries to foreign 
aid does not appear to be affected by the fact that the recipient's 
needs arose in part becam~e the specific economic policies which it 
has opted to pursue have been vigorously objected to by the aid 
donating countries. Even before the NIEO Declaration, 41 countries 
such as Ghana, have invoked debt moratorium as an option in re-
spect to their contractual obligations.'2 The scope of this principle 
40. Schachter, supra note 4, at 10. 
41. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 
3201, Sixth Special Sess., U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974). 
42. Asante, supra note 6, at 7-9. It has been reported that during 1972 a loan request 
from India to the International Development Association resulted in "the first U.S. vote ever 
cast against an IDA or IBRD loan." The United States' objection was based on the ground 
that the loan to buy tankers was meant to provide for the transport of crude oil from Iraqui 
oil fields, nationalized without adequate compensation being paid to the British companies 
involved. The loan was approved in spite of the United States' opposition on this point. "No 
other [IDA] member country voted against the tankers loan; only New Zealand abstained." 
Moulton, On Concealed Dimensions of Third World Involvement in International Economic 
Organizations, 32 INT'L ORGANIZATION 1019, 1024 (1978). 
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is further examined by the International Law Commission in its 
draft reports on "State Responsibility."u 
B. Problems of International Trade, Industrialization, and 
Appropriate Economic Returns for Achieving Progress by 
Developing Countries 
In the area of international trade generally, and raw materials 
and commodity markets in particular, the divergence of views be-
tween the developed and the developing countries has been quite 
striking. The post-war Bretton Woods arrangement, popularly 
known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA TI) 
system has, by the time of the NIEO proposals, already been eroded 
to the point that it can be said to have failed, leaving trade restric-
tions, monopolies, and market control to the individual initiatives 
and exigencies in the few developed countries.44 The large in-flow of 
external capital into Europe through the Marshall Plan and other 
arrangements was able to sustain individual economies from any 
adverse consequences resulting from the freemarket mechanisms, 
and the attendant policies governing protection of foreign invest:-
ments and observance of contractual commitments, because of their 
industrial base, technological capabilities, and a common depend-
ence of the metropolis on imported raw materials. 
The GATT system was envisaged to regulate international 
trade which at that time was carried on largely by private corporate 
structures. With the introduction of state trading, the GA TI regu-
lations, in so far as they concern TNC's role in international trade, 
proved inadequate. Moreover, the double digit inflation within the 
developed countries, coupled with depleting foreign reserves and 
liquid assets of the developing countries, began to erode seriously 
the latter's ability to meet their minimum basic economic develop-
ment projects. It was at this time that the obvious market manipu-
lations of the "seven sisters" in the petroleum market led to the 
OPEC oil pricing decisions. 45 The measures to promote stable ex-
43. United Nations International Law Commission: Report on Draft Articles Adopted 
at the Twenty-Ninth Session (May 9-July 29, 1977), Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 
U.N. Doc. A/32/183, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1249 (1977). See Seventh Report on 
State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/307 (1978); Report of the International Law Commis-
sion on the Work of its 29th Session, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/32/10 
(1977) . Note the strong language in which the International Law Commission's proposals are 
attacked by Mr. Robert Rosenstock, the United States Representative to the Sixth Commit-
tee. Report of the Commission, U.S. Mission Press Release, USUN-112 (Nov. 11, 1977). 
44. See note 13 supra. 
45. Shibata, supra note 6, at 267-68; Shibata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its 
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change rates and to maintain the real value of reserve currencies led 
to the whole issue of indexation; the concept of "just price" for raw 
materials exported by the developing countries is perceived to fall 
within the concerns of international law as well. 46 
A second major category of issues raised by the NIEO, which 
may also be categorized broadly as international trade questions, 
involve making appropriate adjustments to facilitate the expansion 
and diversification of Third World exports. Although realization of 
this goal is seen as requiring cooperation at the intergovernmental 
level, for lower tariffs and for the removal of non-tariff barriers on 
the exports of manufactured goods originating from the Third 
World, major impediments can be found in the restrictive business 
practices of TNCs, their manipulation of the market structure, in-
tracorporate policies, and their influence upon the labour and trade 
union sectors in the industrialized countries. The whole area of 
transportation, insurance, and banking arrangements, referred to as 
"invisible trade," is very much controlled by the TNCs, and the 
Third World demands a role in those sectors as well. 47 
Fundamental to the NIEO is a broadly agreed scheme of index-
ation of Third World export prices in a manner that would tie them 
to the rising prices of the manufactured goods and capital exported 
by the developed countries. Indexation has been shunned and criti-
cized in the international context, although that concept, or its 
functional equivalents, has been freely accepted in certain areas by 
the developed countries. Closely related to indexation is the idea of 
adopting an integrated approach to price supports for an entire 
group of Third World commodity exports. 
It is argued that international trade under such a scheme would 
benefit from the creation of buffer stocks for which "producer asso-
ciations" are seen as a practical vehicle. Consequently, a right of 
association for primary producers is demanded, and the developed 
countries are not only required not to prevent in policy or practice 
the organization of such trading centres, they are called upon to 
finance through a "common fund" the creation of buffer stocks for 
achieving stability in prices. We need only recall here that the abor-
tive attempts under the Havana Charter in 1948 to establish an 
International Trade Organization have failed on the very same issue 
Legality Under International Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 591, 608-21 (1974). 
46. See Schachter, Just Prices in World Markets: Proposals De Lege Ferenda, 69 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 101 (1975). See note 24 supra. 
47. See Dawson, supra note 36; Ripoll, UNCTAD and Insurance, 8 J. WORLD TRADE L. 
75 (1974). 
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of primary commodity policies and the role of cartels. 414 In its place 
commodity prices are attempted to be regulated through interna-
tional commodity agreements between producer and consumer 
countries. The basic'philosophy for such agreements is also reflected 
in Part IV of GATT, adopted in 1966, two years after the first UNC-
T AD meeting. 
The specific policies of international trade demanded by the 
developing countries, such as those mentioned above which appear 
to have an immediate bearing on the emerging principles of interna-
tional law, also include the granting of preferential trade opportuni-
ties. The Generalized System of Preferences operate within a global 
context. For example, through Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
clauses in treaty practice, states may agree to bind themselves to 
accord beneficial trade treatment on terms not less favourable than 
the terms accorded to any third state. The example of the Lome 
Convention, and the ACP-EEC relations in this respect, suggests 
the feasibility of implementing trade preferences on a multilateral 
basis. 49 The International Law Commission, in its draft proposals on 
the MFN treaty practice, 50 advanced the concept of "Most-
Favoured Developing Nation" treatment.51 In the petroleum indus-
try, for example, the MFN treatment has been claimed by the de-
veloping countries and conceded by the TNCs, for purposes of up-
ward revision of the prices of petroleum resources, and such adjust-
ments are periodically made reflecting changes in the contracts en-
tered between them.52 
C. Industrialization and Redeployment 
Although the Programme of Action included some general con-
48. See Martin & Osberg, Trade Unions of the Third World, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND Poucv OF HUMAN WELFARE 501 (R. Macdonald, D. Johnston, & G. Morris ed. 1978). 
49. Lome Convention, 19 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 25) 1 (1976). See Dolan, The Lome 
Convention and Europe's Relationship with the Third World, in 1 REVUE D'INTEGRATION 
EuROPEENE 369 (1978); Gensar, Lome and Beyond, in THE LoMt CONVENTION AND A NEw 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 188-92 (F. Gensar ed. 1977); Gruhn, The Lome Conven-
tion-Inching Towards Interdependence, 30 INT'L ORGANIZATION 241 (1976). 
50. United Nations International Law Commission: Final Draft Articles on Most-
Favored-Nation Clauses in Treaties Between States, U.N. Doc. A/33/192, reprinted in 17 
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1518 (1978). 
51. See Comments on Proposed Article 21 of the International Law Commission Draft, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/308 (1978); Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/309 (1978) (includes N. Ushakov's First Report on Most-Favoured Nation Clause); 
Ustov, International Law Commission: The Most-Favoured Nation Clause, 11 J. WORLD 
TRADE L. 462 (1977). 
52. See Asante, supra note 6. 
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cepts which require the developed countries and international fin-
ancial institutions to promote rapid industrialization of the develop-
ing countries by establishing export oriented industries and projects 
in the developing countries, it is the recommendation made during 
the Second UNIDO Conference in Lima that gave concrete expres-
sion to those policies. The proposal that "the developed countries 
should encourage investors to finance industrial production pro-
jects, particularly export-oriented production, in developing coun-
tries, in agreement with the latter and within the context of their 
laws and regulations,"53 has implications for transnational corpora-
tions in so far as the terms governing the transfer of capital, technol-
ogy, and international trade in manufactured goods are concerned.54 
Direct foreign investment policies implementing the objectives 
of redeployment need to be negotiated, and the terms and condi-
tions of such contractual obligations need to be spelled out in suffi-
cient detail, with the full awareness that such contracts carry with 
them the prospect of complete absorption of the contractual struc-
ture into the local laws and policies of the recipient state. To give 
an example, the same Programme of Action calls for an effort "to 
adapt commercial practices governing transfer of technology to the 
requirements of the developing countries and to prevent abuse of the 
rights of sellers. "55 Technology, patented or not, is property, not in 
the hands of governments, but owned by private corporate enter-
prises. Consequently, any commitment in this respect remains 
purely an ideal unless the transnational corporations owning the 
technology agree to its transfer, to its appropriate adaptation to the 
needs of the recipient state, and to its continuous development to 
meet the evolving needs of the new industrial project.56 
The appropriate framework for achieving the above stated 
53. Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 
G.A. Res. 3202, Sixth Special Sess., U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 5, 12, U.N. Doc. A/9559, 
reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 720, 725 (1974). 
54. United Nations Industrial Development Organization: Lima Declaration and Plan 
of Action on Industrial Development and Co-operation, U.N. Doc. ID/B/155/Add., 
reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 826 (1975); Negotiating the Redeployment of Industrial 
Productive Capacity to Developing Countries, in THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORDER 120-24 (E. Laszlo, R. Baker, E. Eisenberg, & V. Raman ed. 1978). 
55. G.A. Res. 3202, Sixth Special Sess., U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 5, 13, U.N. Doc. 
A/9559, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 720, 728 (1974). 
56. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: Draft Texts Submitted 
to the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on an International Code of Conduct on Transfer 
of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/AC:-i/11 (1977), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 453 
(1978); Gold, The International Transfer and Promotion of Technology, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 549 (R. Macdonald, D. Johnston, & G. Morris ed. 1978). 
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objective must be developed in collaboration with the corporations, 
even if financial aid is forthcoming for such a project from public 
governmental sources in the industrialized countries. It is true con-
siderable effort is made, especially under the auspices of UNCTAD, 
to develop a code of conduct for transfer of technology. 57 Even if we 
assume that such a code will have a mandatory character, its ac-
ceptance at the governmental level may not be sufficient to inter-
pret the scope of the obligations contracted by the government of a 
developing country with a transnational corporation. 
Finally, the whole notion of trade liberalization is intimately 
connected with the developing countries' claims for the elimination 
of the tariff and non-tariff measures of the industrialized countries. 
The developing countries seek "redeployment" of some labour-
intensive, low-technology industries from industrialized countries 
into their countries. While agreement may be reached in some sec-
tors of the industry on this subject, the TNCs regard the claim as 
indistinguishable from any of the other practices in restraint of 
trade.58 A global industrialization policy, as UNIDO has pointed 
out, must come to terms sooner or later with the need for redeploy-
ment, not because the poorer countries need it for a start, but be-
cause the affluent regions will benefit from it in the long run. 
Consider for example the developing country exports-such as 
textiles and leather goods-which are unlikely to cause serious nega-
tive effect on the overall employment in the developed countries. As 
Robert MacNamara pointed out, the developing countries' exports 
of manufactured goods today constitute less than 2% of the manu-
factured goods consumed by the developed nations. 511 Added to that, 
these very same industries are today heavily subsidized in the in-
dustrialized countries to compete with exports. By abandoning ex-
cessive protectionism, the number of workers likely to be displaced 
57. Id. 
58. It has been reported, for example, that Canada is willing, in principle, to relocate 
an important segment of one consumer sector of its bauxite industry processing units in a 
developing country. See Report of the Commonwealth Heads of State or Government Confer-
ence, Kingston, Jamaica (1977). During a seminar held in Mexico City in 1979, an expert from 
Rumania stated his country's willingness to transfer manufacturing of certain sectors of its 
glass industry to developing countries. See also Walter, A Sound Case for Relocation, 12 
INTERECONOMICS 366-68 (1975). 
59. Joint Annual Meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
reprinted in 6 DEVELOPMENT FORUM No. 9 (Oct. 1978) (statement of R. McNamara). For a 
discussion of some of the problems encountered in the redeployment of labour-intensive, low-
technology industries, see Taake & Weiss, The World Textile Arrangement: The Exporter's 
Viewpoint, 8 J. WORLD TRADE L. 624 (1974) . 
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will only be a tiny fraction of those displaced by shifts in technology 
and demand in the industrialized countries themselves. "The pro-
tectionist view overlooked the fact that the loss of jobs due to im-
ports from the developing countries was outweighed by the increase 
in jobs due to the growing volume of exports to those countries made 
possible by the foreign exchange the developing countries are 
thereby able to raise."80 
Similarly, cooperative efforts involving redeployment of indus-
tries are sought in order to shift production from some industrialized 
countries facing congestion and unacceptable levels of pollution 
damaging the environment, thus having the beneficial effect of in-
dustrializing the developing countries. The objection that such a 
policy will leave the developed consumer countries with mere "serv-
icing industries" appears shortsighted. Clearly in these matters in-
tergovernmental cooperation alone cannot yield mutually beneficial 
outcomes unless private banking institutions, multinational mar-
keting agencies, and technology supplying TN Cs also· see that it is 
to their advantage as well. The developing countries in return must 
make sustained efforts to infuse confidence and offer reliable guar-
antees necessary to attract major foreign investments. 
D. Regulation and Control of the Activities of Transnational 
Corporations: Restrictive Business Practices 
In addition to the specific proposals for a NIEO mentioned 
above, which affect in one form or another the operations of TN Cs, 
the Programme of Action has also focussed attention on the need "to 
formulate, adopt and implement an international code of conduct 
for transnational corporations,"81 and to eliminate restrictive busi-
ness practices in whatever form present which adversely affect inter-
national trade, especially that of the developing countries. There is 
virtual unanimity on the overall objective of negotiating a set of 
equitable principles and rules in this regard. Both the UNCTAD 
proposals and the OECD guidelines on this subject emphasize that 
certain TNC practices in restraint of trade should be eliminated, 
although their respective reasons for doing this do not always appear 
to be identical.82 The practices the OECD countries are interested 
60. 6 DEVELOPMENT FORUM No. 9 (Oct. 1978). 
61. G.A. Res. 3202, Sixth Special Sess., U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 5, 13, U.N. Doc. 
A/9559, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 720, 728 (1974). 
62. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: Council Recommenda-
tion Concerning Action Against Restrictive Business Practices, OECD Doc. C(78) 133 (Final) 
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in controlling are all related to maintaining a free competitive mar-
ket system. The type of activities the developing countries are con-
cerned with include also intracorporate transactions, transfer pric-
ing arrangements, and market monopolies. In other words, while 
one side is emphasizing competition, the other side is advocating 
development; while the OECD countries prefer the promotion of a 
voluntary code, the Group of 77 is demanding a legally binding 
multilateral convention. 
The specific practices of the TN Cs sought to be eliminated vary 
considerably from one industry to another. The developed countries 
find it difficult to support a mandatory code prohibiting all types 
of intracorporate transactions, not just those which restrain free 
competition as impermissible intervention with the market mecha-
nisms of international trade. The exemptions for cartels originating 
in developing countries and the preferential treatments sought for 
their domestic enterprises make, according to this view, the whole 
subject of any international regulation of cartels difficult. From the 
point of view of the developing countries, the idea of establishing 
"producer associations" is to achieve stable and equitable return for 
their resources, and as such, is distinguishable from both the techni-
cal antitrust objectives and the cartel-type of activities coming 
within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act83 of the United States. 
The discussions on the subject of restrictive business practices 
in UNCTAD and, in the Intergovernmental Committee of the 
United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations64 illu-
minate the magnitude and complexity of the problems requiring 
international regulation. On the one hand, the developing countries 
are dependent upon the capital, technology, and market informa-
tion supplied by the transnational corporations. On the other hand, 
their own experience has been that many of the largest corporations 
trading in their territory, being subsidiaries of large transnational 
enterprises, control the buying and selling policies of such subsidiar-
ies. Investment-related decisions, including access to the capital of 
(Aug. 9, 1978), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1527 (1978); Control of Restrictive Business 
Practices in the European Economic Community, U.N. Doc. TD/B/608 (1977); Restrictive 
Business Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/B/390 (1973); United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development: Restrictive Business Practices-The Operations of Multinational United 
States Enterprises in Developing Countries, Their Role in Trade and Development, U .N. Doc. 
TD/B/399 (1972). 
63. 15 u.s.c. § § 1-7 (1976). 
64. United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations: Intergovernmental 
Working Group Report on the Formulation of a Code of Conduct, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/31, 
reprinted in 16 !NT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 709 (1977). 
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private banking institutions, the organization and location of a sub-
sidiary, what it should manufacture, to whom it should or should 
not sell, from where the technology and raw materials may be pur-
chased at prices which are artificially high, and if it concerns extrac-
tive industries, the qualitative and quantitative decisions related to 
the resource exploited, are all matters that cannot be captured fully 
by proposals restricted to controlling competition. These are ob-
viously matters affecting the international trade and further pros-
pects of economic development of the developing countries. 
If the developing countries want to attract direct foreign invest-
ment and advanced technology, they must offer the investors incen-
tives to enter into agreements. Fair treatment, economic stability, 
and an opportunity to realize a fair return on capital invested are 
naturally the minimum requirements for promoting international 
cooperation. The critical question is whether in the context of 
NIEO, it is still possible to realize the objectives of the two sides. 
The Andean Code85 on direct foreign investment formulated by the 
countries of Latin America is one such example. 1111 The success or 
failure of such attempts, it is believed, will in large measure depend 
on how the institution of transnational corporation will adapt itself, 
both to remain in business, and to be a vehicle for the realization 
of the aspirations of the vast majority of the sovereign nations in the 
world. 
As already indicated, the NIEO proposals on TNCs cover a 
number of other matters, such as their political influence in the 
formation of the host as well as of the home countries' foreign poli-
cies, intervention in the internal affairs of the host countries, the 
obligation to respect the laws and the economic and social objectives 
of the host countries, and so on. 87 These are certainly propositions 
which are least controversial when presented in international for-
ums as desirable objectives, but it is far from clear how they are to 
be related t.o specific actions of states, including measures of nation-
alization or breaches of the good faith observance of contractual 
commitments. The adoption of a comprehensive code of conduct to 
regulate the activities of transnational corporations may in fact 
65. Decision No. 24, Dec. 31, 1970 as amended by Decisions Nos. 37, June 24, 1971 and 
37-A, July 17, 1971, of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, Andean Foreign Invest-
ment Code, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 126 0972). 
66. For an analysis of the Andean Code, see Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment 
Code: A New Phase in the Quest for Normative Order as to Direct Foreign Investment, 66 
AM. J. INT'L L. 763 (1972). 
67. See note 9 supra. 
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serve to promote the ideals of competition cherished by the free 
market system because, to the extent such ideals reflect the needs 
of global economic development, they will also be applicable to the 
corporations established by developing countries, which are gener-
ally not private enterprises, but are largely state-owned trading 
companies. 
The specific decisions of international judicial and arbitral'bod-
ies in the nationalization and expropriation controversies fall short 
of clarifying the policies most appropriate for the determination of 
what is an "appropriate compensation."68 This is in part attributa-
ble to the "mystifying secrecy" that exists and the inability to ob-
tain full information. There is need for appropriate standards of 
accounting and reporting of the corporate activities, subject to pro-
per safeguards to protect the legitimate areas of confidentiality. 
Given the enormous potential of TNCs as "change agents" for 
development and modernization, it is a pity that the legal structure 
of the transnational corporations has not been developed to face the 
tasks challenging them. As William Halal has pointed out, in the 
post-industrial era, in which the western-developed society is now, 
the global corporation must shed its veil and come into the open to 
play a responsible role. 69 It is unrealistic to advocate an absolute rule 
of prohibition that a TNC or its subsidiary should not in any way 
influence the domestic political and economic policies when the 
enterprise thus concerned is a major, if not the only, source of em-
ployment and foreign exchange to the host state. Nor can it be 
denied that the corporate decisionmaking functions, often restricted 
to a very small group within the corporate management, determin-
ing what products are to be manufactured, how they are to be adver-
tised, at what prices they are to be sold, where they should be 
marketed, and so on, have tremendous social consequences. Ade-
68. See Kollewijn, Nationalization Without Compensation and the Transfer of Property, 
6 NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIIT vooR INT'L RECHT 140 (1959); Lapres, Principles of Compensation 
for Nationalised Property, 26 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 97 (1977); Rood, Compensation for Take-
overs in Africa, 11 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 521 (1977); Weston, The New International Economic 
Order and the Deprivation of Foreign Proprietary Wealth: Reflections upon the Contempo-
rary International Law Debate (unpublished manuscript 1978). See also Weston, 
"Constructive Takings" under International Law-A Modest Foray into the Problem of 
"Creeping Expropriation," 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 103 (1975). For a discussion of the suggestion of 
shifting the burden to where it is most realizable, see Lipson, The Development of Expropria-
tion Insurance: The Role of Corporate Preferences and State Initiatives, 32 INT'L 
ORGANIZATION 351 (1978). 
69. Halal, Alternatives to Growth-II, reprinted in 6 DEVELOPMENT FORUM (Mar. 1978). 
See also Gabriel, Management of Public Interest by the Multinational Corporation, 11 J. 
WORLD TRADE L. 15 (1977). 
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quate realization of the emerging global interdependencies and the 
onerous responsibility they place on the management justify, it ap-
pears, democratization of the corporate decisionmaking structure 
by including in their boards representatives of consumers, employ-
ees, and other groups. The emergence of a representative global 
private enterprise appropriate to the needs of the post-industrial 
society, in which the western-developed countries are today, is at 
once a challenge and an opportunity to promote the common inter-
ests of both the developed and the developing nations of the world. 
E. The Legal Obligation to Transfer Technology 
The normative value of NIEO pronouncements causes consid-
erable speculation when one considers the scope of the rights and 
obligations of parties in an international undertaking to assist eco-
nomic development. The overall NIEO objectives in this area noted 
above find formal enunciation in several specific contexts. For ex-
ample, Article 13 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States declares in the following manner, the obligation to transfer 
technology: 
1. Every State has the right to benefit from the advances and 
developments in science and technology for the acceleration of its 
economic and social development. 
2. All States should promote ... transfer of technology, with pro-
per regard for all legitimate interests including, inter alia, the rights 
and duties of holders, suppliers and recipients of technology. In 
particular, all States should facilitate the access of developing coun-
tries to the achievements of modern science and technology, the 
transfer of technology and the creation of indigenous technology for 
the benefit of the developing countries in forms and in accordance 
with procedures which are suited to their economies and their 
needs. 70 
Further developments in this area have reached the point that the 
international community has begun to articulate the concept of 
technology availability as if the resource in question is part of the 
common heritage of mankind. 71 Especially, the proposals concerning 
70. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, 56, U.N. Doc. A/9631, reprinted 
in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 251, 257 (1975). 
71. The literature on this subject is extensive. See United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development: Draft Texts Submitted to the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on an 
International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/AC.1/11 (1977), 
reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 453 (1978); Report of the African Regional Meeting on a 
Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/CN.141674 (Feb. 11, 1977); 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: Declaration on International 
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exploitation of seabed resources in the international area contained 
in the Informal Composite Negotiating Text72 envisage a legal obli-
gation on the part of the owners of technology holding concessions 
to exploit such resources, to transfer the technology they devise and 
utilize, to the proposed seabed authority, under appropriate safe-
guards.73 
One such safeguard relevant here, is the provision to refer any 
disputes arising in respect of transfer of technology to compulsory 
procedures of third-party settlement, something that is absent in 
the proposals of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States. But, as will be shown below, it is not so much the absence 
of any compulsory dispute settlement procedures, as such, that is 
likely to create difficulties, but the effect of those general policies 
advocated by the large majority of the United Nations Member 
States and endorsed in principle by the industrialized states on 
their respective bargaining positions either at the time of contract 
negotiation or at the time of the termination of a contract for pur-
poses of computing the "appropriate" amount of compensation. 
There are several other proposals in the NIEO declarations 
such as the establishment of an industrial technological information 
bank, the relationship between public grants made in support of 
research and development projects and its bearing on the right of 
other states to impose countervailing tariffs and other duties on 
products marketed utilizing such subsidized technology, the need to 
revise national patent systems and international conventions on 
patents and trademarks to meet the special needs of the developing 
countries and the obligations of the developed countries to give free 
and full access to technologies whose transfer is not subject to pri-
vate decision, and so on, which do carry considerable weight in any 
discussions or negotiations concerning transfer of technology. 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, OECD Press Release A (76) 20 (June 21, 1976), 
reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 967 (1976); United Nations Industrial Development Or-
ganization: Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial Development and Co-
operation, U.N. Doc. ID/B/155/Add.1, reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 826 (1975); G. 
ZAPHIRIOU, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 15 (U .N. Sales No. 
E.75.VI D 1975). 
72. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, 32 U.N. GAOR, Third Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, U.N. Doc. NConf.62/WP.10, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1108 (1977). 
73. See id. annex II, para. 5(j)(iv); Silverstein, Property Protection for Deepsea Mining 
Technology in Return for Technology Transfer: New Approach to Sea-bed Controversy, 2 
FLETCHER F. 15 (1978). 
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F. Cartels, Producer Associations, and International Commodity 
Agreements 
Among the fundamental problems concerning raw materials 
and primary commodities in international trade, the sharp differ-
ences between the two sides are focused on the mechanisms envis-
aged for promoting the interests of the developing countries and on 
the principle establishing a nexus between the prices of raw materi-
als and the prices of imports of manufactured goods in international 
trade. The mechanisms primarily in issue refer to the attempts of 
the raw material exporting countries to form "producer associa-
tions" designed to enhance their bargaining position vis a vis the 
countries which import them. The latter view such efforts as 
"cartelization" of trade inhibiting the free competition of the inter-
national market mechanism. The link between the prices of exports 
of the developing countries and the prices of their imports from 
developed countries, referred to as "indexation," is not only aimed 
at establishing and maintaining just prices for commodities, which 
is its major objective, but also to strengthen the ability of the devel-
oping countries to properly exercise their permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources and economic activities related to such re-
sources. 74 Therefore, global price fluctuations and changing uses of 
a state's resources to further its economic, social, and political pur-
poses, become legitimate grounds for decisions made in the name 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 
G. Protection of the Sovereign Rights of States over their Natural 
Resources and their Freedom of Action 
The most vocal opposition to the NIEO understandably is di-
rected to the provisions in the Programme of Action and the Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States pertaining to the scope and 
content of the concept of permanent sovereignty applied to natural 
resources and to all related economic activities. The issue of com-
pensation to foreign interests nationalized dealt with in Article 
2(2)(c) of the Charter, taken separately as the bone of contention, 
is probably only marginally relevant to all other claims mentioned 
above for achieving equitable redistribution of the global wealth. It 
has become, nevertheless, one of the more visible symbols of con-
frontation between the capital exporting industrial countries (and 
74. See Shibata, supra note 6. Another important consideration here is the impact of 
synthetics on the competitiveness of natural resources, such as rubber, textiles, and leather 
goods. 
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the TNCs which largely originate from them) and the large majority 
of the developing nations who have supported the principles as 
stated in Article 2. 
The concept of permanent sovereignty articulated in Article 2 
is supported by many other subtle policies in the NIEO declaration 
which, although not openly challenged, characterize the scope and 
meaning of the principles of international law advocated for protec-
tion in the future of direct · foreign investments. For example, the 
provisions concerning political and economic independence (Arti-
cles 1 & 4), non-intervention (Articles 2, 5, 7 & 18), equality (Arti-
cles 10, 17 & 32) provide the backdrop or context relevant for an-
swering such claims as whether a country's nationalization mea-
sures are "arbitrary," in furtherance of "public purpose," or other-
wise "reasonable." Furthermore, the train of resolutions on this 
subject adopted during 1974, including General Assembly Resolu-
tions 3171,75 3201,76 of the Sixth Special Session, and 3281, proclaim-
ing the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 77 is re-
garded by the developed industrialized states as a departure from 
established international norms in three important aspects. They 
fail to proscribe discriminatory foreign wealth deprivations; they 
fail to mention the applicability of an international law standard; 
and they do not recognize obligatory settlement by an international 
tribunal of disputes concerning issues of compensation.78 Their 
omission is made conspicuous by the fact that an earlier United 
Nations Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty79 accepted by the 
free-market industrialized states did contain those references .. 80 For 
75. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 30) 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973), reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT1LS 238 (1974). 
76. Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 
3201, Sixth Special Sess., U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974). 
77. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). 
78. Weston, The New International Economic Order and the Deprivation of Foreign 
Proprietary Wealth: Reflections Upon the Contemporary International Law Debate (unpub-
lished manuscript 1978). 
79. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962). 
80. There is extensive writing on this subject. See Banerjee, The Concept of Permanent 
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 8 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 515 (1968); Hyde, Permanent Sover-
eignty Over Natural Wealth and Resources, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 854 (1956); O'Keefe, The 
United Nations and Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 8 J. WORLD TRADE L. 
239 (1974); Onejeme, The Law of Natural Resources Development: Agreements Between 
Developing Countries and Foreign Investors, 5 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 1 (1977). Reports of 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations on this subject include: U .N. Doc. E/5986 (1977) 
(discussing the current contractual practices which have a bearing on the concept of perma-
nent sovereignty); U.N. Doc. A/9716 (1974); Summary of Views Expressed by Governments 
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these reasons, the arbitrator in the Libya-Oil Companies 
Arbitration concluded that "Article 2 of this Charter must be ana-
lyzed as a political rather than as a legal declaration concerned with 
the ideological strategy of development and, as such, supported only 
by non-industrialized States. "81 
Pending a more detailed inquiry of this important international 
award, it may be stated briefly that the issue whether a developing 
country, or, for that matter any state, has the right to deprive the 
property and wealth of a foreign investor, especially when such a 
deprivation is admittedly of an arbitrary nature and discriminatory 
in effect, pertains, not to the economic policies of development, but 
to the right of a state to apply economic coercion for attaining its 
objectives.82 The assumptions underlying these objections are that 
in some instances such deprivations may result from nationalization 
and, therefore, the NIEO should have made provisions to cover such 
situations; especially that the reference to "all economic activities" 
in the NIEO provisions on permanent sovereignty is to cover all 
profits made by a corporation irrespective of the appropriateness of 
its transfer pricing policies. It also includes reading into the doctrine 
competence to invoke and apply pricing and production control 
measures, not as incidents of the contractual arrangement, but as 
"sovereign rights" related to the ownership of the resource itself. For 
example, Dr. Shibata has written: 
[N]othing in the present system of international law prevents a 
producing country from selling its primary products at whatever 
prices it chooses to fix. Indeed, the right of every country freely to 
dispose of its national wealth is an integral part of the universally 
acknowledged principle that a State possesses sovereignty over all 
of its natural resources.83 
A second objection, which is of a general nature, made in respect of 
compensation provisions in Article 2 of the Charter, is that, unless 
direct foreign investments are legally protected from unjust depriva-
at the 28th Session of the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. E/5549 
(1974). 
81. Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, supra note 1, at 30. 
82. "The use of export controls for political purposes is so widespread that no general 
rule of international custom could have developed to the contrary." Shibata, supra 
note 6, at 267 (footnote omitted). See Boorman, Economic Coercion in International Law: 
The Arab Oil Weapon and the Ensuing Juridical Issues, 9 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 205 (1974); 
Lillich, Economic Coercion and the "New International Economic Order": A Second Look 
at Some First Impressions, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 233 (1976). 
83. Shibata, supra note 6, at 268 (footnote omitted). 
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tion, the avowed objectives of NIEO cannot be realized. 
Although the NIEO Charter advocates equality of treatment 
and a national standard and emphasizes the procedures of direct 
negotiation and other internal remedies as avenues for their settle-
ment, appropriate compensation in conformity with established in-
ternational law standards, are seen as indispensible safeguards by 
the industrialized states. On the other hand, the developing coun-
tries argue that any reference to the established international law 
standards is a reference to the classical doctrine of prompt, effec-
tive, and full compensation, determined in accordance with the 
market value stipulated by the industrialized countries. This argu-
ment tends to place emphasis on the goals of "development," eco-
nomic conditions and capabilities of the nationalizing states, cri-
teria of "need" alluded to above, and other similar factors, to which 
the classical doctrine of international law is characteristically indif-
ferent. The argument is that if the developing countries enrich 
themselves at the expense of direct foreign investments, western 
technology, research and development, capital, access to markets, 
and so on, then they should compensate the foreign owners ade-
quately and appropriately. Failure to do so, it is alleged, would 
result in "unjust enrichment" proscribed by international law. On 
the key notions of what is "unjust" and how much is "appropriate" 
compensation, the literature both recounts a rich experience and 
abounds with sharp controversy. 84 
As a matter of fact, much of this controversy seems quite un-
necessary. The practice of states, just before and since the adoption 
of the NIEO Charter, confirms the preference of a far higher degree 
of conformity to the legal requirements of justice and appropriate 
compensation than is sometimes alleged in academic writings."5 The 
experts on this subject, especially in the Western industrialized 
countries, readily admit that there is no basis either in theory or in 
practice to the claim that existing international law has established 
any norms which require that nationalizations should be for a 
"public purpose" or "nondiscriminatory" as between the national 
and foreign enterprises. The claim that there exists a customary 
international law norm of an "international standard" is challenged 
84. See note 68 supra. 
85. See U.N. Doc. E/5986 (1977); U.N. Doc. A/9716, and A/9716/Corr.1 (1974) (reporting 
over 875 cases involving developing countries during the period of 1960-1974, and the extent 
of compensation paid in some important instances); Asante, supra note 6. For a comprehen-
sive view of recent nationalization cases, see H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
PROBLEMS 357-522 (2d ed. 1976). 
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by the showing of Latin American conceptions of international law 
on the matter. 88 
When we get into specifics, the responses to nationalizations in 
almost every case require a complex and subtle examination of the 
issues and factors involved. Oscar Schachter points out the dynam-
ics of compensation negotiations, which appear to answer in part the 
objections levelled to the NIEO declaration mentioned earlier: 
When a controversy arises over expropriation, it is almost certain 
that issues of fair treatment and "appropriate" compensation will 
be raised within the negotiating or settlement framework estab-
lished by the expropriating government. The argument then is not 
on the issue of national competence but about the specific circum-
stances and the criteria to be applied. We can reasonably assume 
that the perception of these issues will be substantially affected by 
standards developed in other contexts, whether they are stated ex-
plicitly or not. This would be so even though the references to gov-
erning law are limited to the legislation of the expropriating coun-
try.s1 
The fact that in most post-nationalization arrangements the 
same foreign enterprises continue in a contractual or consultancy 
arrangement to carry on the transactions may in fact serve to allay 
claims of any unjust enrichment. This may be due to the fact, as 
Phillip de Seynes mentioned, that "non-renewable resources ac-
quire value largely through international markets and those re-
sources can be exploited only through most complex technological 
and logistic operations."88 This having been recognized, one wonders 
why the developing countries were reluctant to employ the phrase 
"international law" in an appropriate context in the largely descrip-
tive narration of Article 2 of the Charter. 
The answer to this question would take us into a much wider 
86. See EXPROPRIATION IN THE AMERICAS (A. Lowenfeld ed. 1977); DeWaart, Permanent 
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources As a Cornerstone for International Economic Rights and 
Duties, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS IN HONOR OF A.J.P. TAMMES 304 (H. 
Meyers & E. Vierdag ed. 1977); Farer, Economic Development Agreements: A Functional 
Analysis, 10 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 200 (1971); Moran, Politics of Nationalisation and the 
Evolution of Concession Agreements, 1972 Paoc. AM. Soc'v INT'L L. 216; Roy, Is the Law of 
Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal International Law?, 55 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 863 (1961); Schreuer, Unjustified Enrichment in International Law, 22 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 281 (1974); Comment, The Libyan Expropriations: Further Developments on the 
Remedy of Invalidation of Title, 11 Hous. L. REV. 924 (1974). See also Menchaca, 
Multinational Firms and the Processes of Regional Economic Integration, 150 RECUEIL DES 
Couas 337 (1977). 
87. Schachter, supra note 4, at 8. 
88. De Seynes, Transnational Corporations and Development, 1 C.T.C. REP. 1 (1976). 
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discourse of the various theories of international law, which is be-
yond the scope of this inquiry; suffice it to say that the vast majority 
of the developing nations project the NIEO as a demand for change 
from existing international law. They view the law of international 
trade as a whole, and the doctrine of State Responsibility in so far 
as it relates to international trade, as a law of laissez-faire favoring 
the industrially developed states. Often changes in law have been 
achieved only by a radical departure from it initiated by interested 
states. Virtually, by hypothesis, any state which seeks to make new 
law cannot be expected to agree to litigate under old law, for what 
they proclaim as new law will have to be received as violation of the 
old. Indeed, much of the debate during the UNCTAD preparatory 
meetings in the working group drafting the Charter on the issue 
whether the latter should be binding convention or remain a Gen-
eral Assembly resolution, underscored this difficulty. The develop-
ing countries also realize that any attempts to project new law by 
deviant action is a time-consuming affair, which would be met not 
with acclaim or acquiescence on the part of the industrialized 
states, but with protest and resistence. Notwithstanding this, it 
appears a tactical mistake on the part of the drafters to omit com-
pletely any reference to international law in Article 2 of the Charter. 
From a substantive point of view, this deliberate omission of 
any reference to international standards must be seen as the result 
of two kinds of failures on the part of the international community. 
The failure of international law to develop first-order principles 
allocating the equitable share of the raw material exporting devel-
oping countries in the global economic growth, and the failure of the 
industrialized, raw material importing developed countries and 
their TN Cs to negotiate agreements for the establishment of institu-
tions and procedures to deal on a regular continuing basis with the 
problems of underdevelopment and inequitable distribution of the 
benefits in the international distribution of labor. The failure of 
international law to develop these basic inclusive policies for global 
wealth process on the one hand, and the insistence with which it 
applies procedures and concepts borrowed from private national law 
to explain international trade relationships, on the other hand, ap-
pears to some extent to be the reason why the Charter is couched 
in terms of the demands and expectations only of the developing 
states. 
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IV. SOME FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTUAL IMPEDIMENTS 
BLOCKING AGREEMENT ON WAYS AND MEANS OF 
REALIZING THE NIEO OBJECTIVES 
We have noted above the wide range and the specific character 
of the aspirations of the developing countries for achieving economic 
progress, and the tremendous interdependence in that respect be-
tween the interests of the developed and of the developing countries. 
The effective realization of some of the stated NIEO objectives is 
seen dependent upon the creation of a climate of positive goodwill 
to sustain the affluent segments and to undertake the responsibility 
to assist the poorer segments of the society (e .g., meeting the ODA 
targets) and thereby achieve international economic security. The 
basis for promoting such an "obligation" in the NIEO is recognized 
to be no different from similar obligations which have been found 
in other situations, such as in the area of international trusteeship 
leading to self-determination contained in the Charter of the United 
Nations. In respect to some other claims, the requirements for mak-
ing structural changes in the economic process and establishing new 
modalities of decisionmaking, for example, the operations of the 
IMF and World Bank, call for meaningful arrangements to promote 
the effective participation of all segments of the society proportion-
ate to the interests affected by such decisions. This is a fundamental 
tenet of all constitutive processes seeking to claim authority and 
respect. 89 
The assumption that a globally integrated economic union can-
not be envisaged without the prior establishment of a global politi-
cal union is belied when one considers that the European Economic 
Community was not prevented from coming into being without the 
counterpart of a European political community. But in respect of 
most other NIEO claims relating to international trade, foreign in-
vestment in resources, and achieving economic growth in real terms, 
the fundamental conflict between the two sides vis ci vis NIEO 
remains unresolved. Ernst Petersmann echoes the concern of the 
developed economies in this manner: 
As long as the OECD states consider the NIEO concept as an assault 
on fundamental principles of existing international economic law 
(non-discrimination, reciprocity, market economy, freedom of prop-
erty, and contract), the role of international law as a legal basis for 
international development aid will remain small (cf. the non-
89. See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 7. 
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binding character of the UNCTAD system of preferences, and the 
lack of non-contractual legal obligations for development aid) and 
world economic reforms will continue to be tackled on a de facto 
basis . . . . Similarly the success of the . . . Charter . . . will de-
pend on a diminution of the legal and economic divergences between 
industrial nations and LDC's.90 
49 
What are the "fundamental principles of international eco-
nomic law" which stand in the way of a NIEO? How much of the 
stated NIEO objectives constitute a serious threat to undermine the 
common interest conveyed by those principles? Assuming that they 
do, is it not possible to clarify, then, where their common interest 
precisely is, given a genuinely shared perception of the increasingly 
obvious interdependence among the developed and the developing 
states? Three major areas of critical importance for the mainte-
nance of an effective global wealth process may be identified. Al-
though they are interrelated, each have generated a veritable reper-
tory of fundamental legal concepts. These are:(l) the institution of 
corporate personality; (2) the inviolability of private property; and 
(3) the binding character of contractual obligations. The arguments 
in favour of NIEO are seen to suffer from both an inadequate recog-
nition of the fundamental common interests relevant to these mat-
ters, and the unexplained premises upon which international eco-
nomic activity is expected to operate, assuming that all those NIEO 
demands are acceptable in principle. 
Much of the attention in recent years, especially since the call 
for the establishment of a NIEO, is focussed on the role of transna-
tional corporations in the economic development of the developing 
countries. Despite their public role as "change agents," effecting 
global economic, social, and even political developments in many 
parts of the world, their corporate decisionmaking structure is prob-
90. Petersmann, The New International Economic Order-Principles, Politics and Inter-
national Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 449, 465 (R. Macdon-
ald, D. Johnston, & G. Morris ed. 1978). In his brilliant analysis of the problems confronting 
present NIEO claims, Petersmann stated: 
The opinio ju.ris and legal practice of OECD states seems to be of particular import-
ance as it is to them to whom some of the new obligations are exclusively addressed 
. . . and on whose co-operation depends the realization of even those obligations 
postulated for all states. . . . It is recognized in the jurisprudence of the ICJ that 
universal international law cannot be created against the will of an entire group of 
states and that the will of the individual states most affected does play a decisive 
role. 
Id. This is obviously true. See note 129 infra. The purpose of invoking customary practice, 
not to mention concepts of ju.s cogens, in the Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration is to manage 
precisely that agreement, not explicitly and directly, but through uniformity of behavior. 
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ably the most centralized, inward-looking, and autocratic of any 
known social organization of comparable scope in the modern world. 
They generate the necessary skills and technology, they organize 
and control the market system, and they bring the required private 
capital essential for the development of resources. Because of the 
private proprietary character of their basic values-maximum 
profit being their primary if not the only objective-they have failed 
to achieve the desired equitable division of labour on the global 
level. Indeed, the major objections to the NIEO claims have been 
focussed, precisely for this reason, on the scope and meaning of the 
permanent sovereignty principles and the related concepts concern-
ing nationalization and the good faith performance of contractual 
obligations of states. 
For the great majority of the newly independent developing 
countries, genuinely interested in maintaining an equitable and just 
international economic and commercial relationship, and who are 
increasingly conscious of the fact that very soon some among them 
will themselves be exporters of technology and suppliers of foreign 
investment capital, it is not the fundamental juridical notions un-
derlying the concepts of good faith, property protection, and corpo-
rate personality that are in issue. What is in issue here is the kind 
of policies inherited from a colonial context, which continue to be 
policies projected as immutable principles of international law, that 
they challenge and desire to change, in the larger interest of achiev-
ing an inclusive and integrated global economic and wealth system. 
The basic legal concepts alluded to above have been described 
by Samuel Asante as "the fundamental underpinnings of the old 
international economic order,"91 and in a real sense operate as impe-
diments for achieving global economic justice and equity. They are 
indeed fundamental, because they question the meaning and scope 
of such notions as "the inviolability of private property," "the 
sanctity of the private international contract," and the interna-
tional "personality" of corporate enterprises. Unless the underlying 
legal concepts are appropriately clarified and adapted to fulfill the 
shared objectives of global economic development, international 
equity, and tolerable economic equality among the developed and 
the developing states, international law, it is argued, will remain an 
object of unnecessary confrontation. Dr. Asante expressed this con-
cern rather forcefully: 
91. Asante, supra note 6, at 2. 
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[Tlhe system which has been the object of much rhetoric at 
the United Nations and other political fora is supported by a formi-
dable and highly sophisticated armoury of legal and commercial 
concepts which need a radical revision if the international economic 
order is to be effectively restructured .... 
. . . First, concepts such as ownership, contract, corporate person-
ality which appear quite innocuous within the context of a munici-
pal legal system may have grave implications when transplanted 
into the sphere of transnational transactions. Second, it is an estab-
lished legal tradition in Europe and, to some extent, America, to 
refer to these legal concepts as the colourless tools of a legal system. 
Yet any perceptive observer will concede that these concepts con-
note discrete value systems of a distinct individualistic bias, which 
are often manifestly inimical to the aspirations and development 
goals of new nations. They should therefore not be accorded the 
status of immutable and universal postulates.112 
51 
Concepts of private ownership characterized the property controlled 
by transnational corporations in the extractive industries. Not only 
the fixed assets and mining structures, in which they had made 
financial investments, but the natural resources of the host country 
became, until the expiration of the period stipulated in the conces-
sions (often extending over a few generations!), the property owned 
by the foreign investor. Such ownership included exclusive control 
over the production, processing, and marketing of the particular 
resource. Even after their political independence, because of the 
nature and scope of the investor ownership tied down to the control 
over markets and the supply of technology, the developing countries 
remained, for all practical purposes, only the nominal possessors of 
their property. Indeed, even after nationalization or similar mea-
sures, for the most part the developing countries had to continue to 
rely upon and consult the same foreign corporations, under some 
newly devised arrangements, forsaking effective control in order to 
realize the full range of their economic development programs. 
Because natural resources acquire a wealth value only when 
brought into the market place, the institution of contract remains 
the major tool governing the relations between the foreign investor 
and the host state. The sanctity of contract is derived from the basic 
postulate pacta sunt servanda, that agreements should be observed 
in good faith. The notion that long-term developmental arrange-
ments concerning a basic natural resource of a state (often it may 
92. Id. 
35
Raman: Transnational Corporations & NIEO
Published by SURFACE, 1978
52 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol.6:17 
be the only resource it may have to achieve economic progress) are 
a species of private law of contract defies rational accommodation 
of the competing objectives of the two sides to the agreement. While 
the options open to the territorial sovereign appear to be zeroed 
toward a joint venture or outright nationalization, the compensa-
tory options open to the TNC are in fact quite v~ried and extensive. 
Intracorporate pricing practices, restrictions on the availability of 
technology and its exhorbitant costs, and manipulations of the in-
ternational markets are some of the well-known devices employed. 
One unhappy consequence of this phenomenon of inter-affiliate 
transactions is that sometimes materials and equipment are pro-
cured by these overseas affiliates at prices far above the prevailing 
market prices, while the production of the joint venture is some-
times sold at prices below the prevailing world market level. 
. . . All this demonstrates that the mere acquisition of majority 
equity interest does not extricate African extractive industries from 
the global network of Western multinational corporations or the 
incidents of the old economic order. The brutal facts of Western 
economic power and technical superiority still make the concept of 
African control of this sector of their economy largely illusory .11:1 
Indeed, the classical Western position of international law on this 
subject, contained in the oft-quoted declaration of a former Secre-
tary of State for the United States, Cordell Hull, made in protest 
of the Mexican agrarian expropriations reads as follows: "Under 
every rule of law and equity, no government is entitled to expropri-
ate private property, for whatever purpose, without provision for 
prompt, adequate and effective payment therefor."94 
The 1962 United Nations declaration on permanent sover-
eignty95 may be interpreted as requiring a nationalization to be non-
discriminatory, and for a public purpose with appropriate compen-
sation. Professors Lillich and Weston have written that even the 
nondiscriminatory character and public purpose requirements are 
policies which from the national point of view are hard to enforce 
and easy to be overcome in a great many situations. As a matter of 
fact, the term "appropriate" in the 1962 Declaration is a significant 
departure from the classical formulation of "prompt, adequate and 
effective," while referring to compensation although the General 
Assembly has not defined what constitutes appropriate compensa-
93. Id. at 5. 
94. 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 658-59 (1942). 
95. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962). 
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tion. Consequently, it becomes important to appraise whether the 
NIEO objectives directly or indirectly affect the meaning and scope 
of this requirement. The recent arbitral award in the Libyan oil 
concessions case represents, in this respect, an important event re-
sponding to the newly advanced claims of the developing countries. 
V. THE LIBYA-OIL COMPANIES ARBITRATION (1977) 
On September 1, 1973 and February 1974, Libya promulgated 
decrees purporting to nationalize all the rights, interests, and prop-
erty of Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company, and California 
Asiatic Oil Company, granted under fourteen Deeds of Concession.1111 
This action is believed to have been taken in response to the foreign 
corporations' refusal to agree to the Libyan demand to curtail the 
production of its crude oil by approximately half the existing levels, 
to increase by almost four times the then existing price of its crude 
oil, and also perhaps, to controls over the destination of its resource. 
The companies argued that the Libyan Government's actions vio-
lated the terms and conditions of their Deeds of Concession. The 
companies invoked the provisions in.the concessions for compulsory 
arbitration and requested the President of the International Court 
of Justice to name an arbitrator. In a letter addressed to the Regis-
trar of the Court, Libya, claiming its decision was an act of sover-
eignty over its natural resources, referred to the NIEO declarations, 
specifically to the provisions recognizing the competence of national 
procedures for resolving disputes relating to nationalization.117 Pro-
fessor Rene-Jean Dupuy, acting as the sole arbitrator, rendered an 
award for the plaintiffs holding that they are entitled to restitutio 
in integrum. 98 Subsequently, a settlement was reached under which 
Libya agreed to provide the companies, over a fifteen month period, 
$152 million worth of crude oil from its refineries.99 
Although the Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration is narrowly fo-
cussed-limited to the question whether the Libyan decree consti-
tutes a breach of the Deeds of Concession-and does not go into the 
96. Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, supra note 1, at 1. See Comment, supra note 86. 
For the terms of the Libyan Producer's Agreement, see 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 687 (1974). 
97. Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, supra note 1, at 27 (quoting the Memorandum of 
the Libyan Government, dated July 26, 1974). 
98. Id. at 32-37. 
99. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1977, at 55, col. 1; Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1977, at 6, col. 4. 
Each of the two companies involved was to receive crude oil valued at $76 million. Prior to 
1973, the two subsidiaries had produced a total of 400,000 barrels of oil a day. This was 
reduced by half. 
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merits of the Libyan measures, or their admissibility for terminat-
ing the contracts and their validity under general international law, 
the Arbitration is significant in that it constitutes the first direct 
international response to the general demands for a new economic 
order represented by the NIEO declarations. By a different method, 
albeit the conventional route, the arbitrator reached the issues, 
making on the way some far-reaching statements about the signifi-
cance of the NIEO principles to any claim of an emerging interna-
tional customary law. This was done by inquiring whether the Deeds 
of Concession are "contracts," what law is applicable for their inter-
pretation, and whether this law requires, in the event of their unilat-
eral breach, payment of an appropriate compensation. 
Although Libya does not appear to have invoked the NIEO 
principles for purposes of challenging the material scope and con-
tent of its obligations to the companies arising as a result of its 
nationalization, but only to question the competence of the interna-
tional procedures invoked for examining its actions, the arbitrator 
nevertheless examined the substantive effect of the NIEO princi-
ples, while considering the applicable international law to the 
claims advanced by the applicants. Only those aspects of the Arbi-
tration directly relevant to present discussion are noted here, in 
particular, (1) the international character of the contractual com-
mitments; (2) the meaning of "applicable law" for their interpreta-
tion, and (3) the scope and content of the "appropriate compensa-
tion" principle in light of the NIEO Declarations on Permanent 
Sovereignty over natural resources. 
A. The Contractual Nature of the Deeds of Concession and the 
Doctrine of "Good Faith" 
The fourteen Deeds of Concession under which the companies 
acquired their legal rights have a contractual character in the sense 
they define the obligations of the parties, the law applicable to 
them, and the agreement of both sides to consider such applicable 
law as "frozen" from any unilateral changes, prompted by external 
or internal developments whether of a political, economic, or social 
character. 
It appears . . . from a formal point of view and prima facie, the 
Deeds of Concession in dispute were of a contractual nature since 
they expressed an agreement of the wills of the conceding State and 
of the concession holders. Furthermore, the contractual nature of 
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the Deeds of Concession corresponds to the standard accepted both 
by international practice and by international theory .... 100 
55 
The "freezing of conditions" clause in the contract is believed to be 
an essential feature of the commitment designed to insulate the 
regime of the contract from the effect of public policy. As one writer 
has observed: 
The contractual nature of a concession in the international field is 
in fact no longer seriously disputed either by writers or in case law. 
The judge or international arbitrator does not always even take the 
trouble to demonstrate the contractual nature of the deed: he simply 
states it. 101 
Obviously, what is at stake here is the certainty and stability of the 
expectations of the parties to an agreement. The arbitrator con-
ceded that a concession deed can sometimes amount to more than 
a contract. But "this is only true when it has been conferred by and 
contained in a legislative instrument." 102 Since these are not of a 
public nature, the public policy doctrine has no application. 
Another type of international contract mentioned by the arbi-
trator is the so-called "administration type of contract" 10:1 found to 
be present within the national legal systems of states. On the ground 
that an administrative type of contract is essentially an unequal 
agreement because both sides admit renegotiation of its terms, it is 
not applicable where the parties have agreed to freeze the conditions 
of the national law applicable to the agreement, as they existed at 
the time the contracts were made by them. Moreover, 
One should take into account here the fact that the theory of admin-
istrative contracts is somewhat typically French: it is consecrated 
by French law and by certain legal systems which have been in-
spired by French law. But it is unknown in many other legal systems 
which are as important as the French system and it has not been 
accepted by international law notwithstanding wishes which de Lege 
ferenda may have been expressed in this field. 104 
There are many valid reasons for upholding the sanctity of contrac-
tual terms if one can assume that the contract continues to operate 
100. Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, supra note 1, at 10. 
101. Id. (quoting M. COHEN-JONATHAN, LES CONCESSIONS EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
133-34 (1966)). 
102. Id. at 11 (quoting Mann, Contrats entre Etats et Personnes Privees Etrangeres: The 
Theoretical Approach Towards the Law Governing Contracts between States and Private 
Persons, 1975 REV. BELGE D.I. 562, 564). 
103. Id. at 19. 
104. Id. at 21. 
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on the principle of strict equality between the parties. Admittedly, 
the parties intended to contract on a footing of strict equality but 
when the balancing context is disrupted, it appears it is not abstract 
doctrines of equality that characterize their continuing obligations, 
but their obligation to adjust their respective rights under the con-
tract to correspond to their initial commitment. In other words, 
those who advocate renegotiation of international concessions argue 
that the freezing clauses to which they agreed (the State Party is 
acting not jure imperii but as jure questionis as an ordinary con-
tracting party) should not be interpreted to perpetuate an artificial 
context of equality unresponsive to the economic and political de-
velopments which are taking place. 
A long-term investment agreement spelling out comprehensively the 
relations between the Government and the corporation in respect of 
the development and marketing of a major natural resource and 
specifying all relevant fiscal arrangements is anything but a private 
contract-an institution of the market place. Governments of less 
developed countries quite properly regard these agreements as 
major instruments of public policy-a prominent feature of their 
development strategies, hardly distinguishable from a development 
plan. •o5 
Admitting that long term Deeds of Concession are in the nature 
of public contracts, this argument does not answer the validity in 
law of a state's commitment not to use its sovereign powers to vi-
tiate the contract which it has freely made to the corporation, which 
assurance is in the first place an important consideration for the 
companies to enter into an agreement and risk extensive financial 
investment. Invoking the principle of good faith as defined in the 
Sapphire Arbitral Award, 106 the arbitrator came to the conclusion 
that the Deeds of Concession in dispute had a binding force. 1117 
The essential difficulty in this dilemma is not so much the 
applicability of the doctrine of good faith, which is also mentioned 
in the NIEO Charter, but the objectives for which it is invoked. 
When the claim for renegotiation is found unacceptable, it often 
meets with the claim of pacta sunt servanda. As Dr. Asante has 
pointed out, renegotiation is generally rejected as a helpful tool for 
maintaining contractual obligations. 
105. Asante, supra note 6, at 2. 
106. 35 l.L.R. 136 (1963). 
107. Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, supra note 1, at 37. 
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Renegotiation is now an incontrovertible fact of the current invest-
ment process throughout the developing world . . . . Yet investors 
are loathe to accept express stipulations for renegotiation in invest-
ment agreements. Why? Investors are understandably concerned 
about the security of their deal, and this yearning for certainty 
induces them to maintain the pretence that a deal once concluded 
would endure .... Multinational corporations protest that renego-
tiation is fundamentally offensive to the financing arrangements 
made with their financiers which are predicated on the assumption 
that the undertaking will yield a certain return at a specific time to 
amortize the investment .... Some investors concede that they 
would be prepared to honour an invitation to renegotiate, but they 
argue that it is a bad precedent to expressly provide for it. 11111 
57 
On the other hand, the considerations for enforcing a contract, 
especially a long term concessionary contract such as in the petro-
leum industry, is to protect, as the arbitrator has pointed out, pre-
cisely those interests which the corporations seek to ensure through 
the operation of law, outside the legislation of the host state. 
[T]he emphasis on the contractual nature of the legal relation 
between the host State and the investor is intended to bring about 
an equilibrium between the goal of the general interest sought by 
such relation and the profitability which is necessary for the pursuit 
of the task entrusted to the private enterprise. The effect is also to 
ensure to the private contracting party a certain stability which is 
justified by the considerable investments which it makes in the 
country concerned. The investor must in particular be protected 
against legislative uncertainties, that is to say the risks of the mu-
nicipal law of the host country being modified, or against any gov-
ernment measures which would lead to an abrogation or rescission 
of the contract. Hence, the insertion, as in the present case, of so-
called stabilization clauses: these clauses tend to remove all or part 
of the agreement from the internal law and to provide for its correla-
tive submission to sui generis rules . . . or to a system which is 
properly an international law system. 109 
However, the arbitrator's options here appear quite limited in 
view of the absence of the defendant before the tribunal, a factor 
not acknowledged as such. The initial Deeds of Concession had in 
fact been changed by mutual agreement. 1111 Not only had the parties' 
shared expectations of the principles governing the applicable law 
108. Asante, supra note 6, at 3. 
109. Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, supra note 1, at 17. 
110. Id. at 14-15. 
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"varied over time," the arbitrator notes that the parties' agreement 
at every stage "had a very distinct contractual character: it is truly 
the whole balance of the contract that was at stake . . . . This did 
in fact improve the legal situation of the concession holders while, 
for its part, the defendant Government obtained, as a counterpart, 
substantial economic advantages." 111 When there is failure to agree 
or to approve new changes, the contractual balance is lost, a balance 
which was intended and achieved by the contracting parties. Is it 
then merely the logic of the circumstances, which had permitted the 
companies to agree on more than one occasion to basic changes in 
the concessions that made them "legal," but did not allow them to 
agree, either for commercial or for political reasons, the changes 
proposed in 1973 that they became "illegal"? If a contract is a 
"union of free wills" and if a concession contract of long duration 
virtually determining the economic security of a sovereign state 
must be based on a contractual balance, what gives one side a 
unique veto power on that security? Is not the source of authority 
for determining the meaning of the obligations of the parties to 
perform their commitments in good faith then to be located, not in 
the regime of the concession, nor in the national legal system of the 
government, but in the changing concepts of international law 
itself? 
More precisely, should we not take into account for the preser-
vation of the needed "balancing" of interests, the equilibrium of the 
market, stability of the pricing arrangements, the scarcities and 
demands on the commodity, the economic and political goals of the 
sovereign, and other similar considerations? Is it not a simplistic 
exercise in academic irrelevance to suggest that because the parties 
had intended to deal on a footing of equality, that equality somehow 
is captured and sealed in the black letter of the contract, unaffected 
by the changing world context? These questions are germane and 
the arbitrator has indeed dealt with them at length when consider-
ing the scope and meaning of the principle of "applicable law" 
governing the concessions. 
B. The Scope and Meaning of a Reference to National Law and 
Legislation in Respect of Claims of Permanent Sovereignty 
Clause 28 of the Deeds of Concession described the applicable 
law as follows: 
111. Id. at 15. 
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This concession shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance 
with the law of Libya and such rules and prindples of international 
law as may be relevant but only to the extent that such rules and 
principles are not inconsistent with and do not conflict with the laws 
of Libya. 112 
59 
This revised formulation of the applicable law agreed upon by the 
parties in 1963, amending an earlier statement on the same subject, 
clearly recognizes the applicability of the Libyan law, supplemented 
wherever necessary by principles of international law.11:1 The arbi-
trator recognized the need to establish a distinction between the law 
which governs the contract and the legal order from which the bind-
ing nature of the contract stems. By referring to the provisions under 
which the parties have agreed to have recourse to the International 
Court of Justice for purposes of constituting an arbitral tribunal, the 
Arbitration concluded that it "implies that it was their intention 
that this arbitration should come under the aegis of the United 
Nations and, therefore, the system of law governing this arbitration 
should be international law."m 
It should be noted that the invocation of the general principles 
of law does not occur only when the municipal law of the contracting 
State is not suited to petroleum problems . . . [or] by the lack 
of adequate legislation in the state considered .... It is also justi-
fied by the need for the private contracting party to be protected 
against unilateral and abrupt modifications of the legislation in the 
contracting State: it plays, therefore, an important role in the con-
tractual equilibrium intended by the. parties. 115 
This is quite true. But, it does not answer what comparable policies 
apply to the recurring claims of states . to exercise their permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources, contracted out under those con-
cessions when the terms and conditions for their continued perform-
ance have become, in the opinion of one of the parties, inequitable, 
unjust, or onerous. 
The reference to international law in that context, it is con-
tended, is a reference to the changing concepts, practices, and 
norms which reflect considerations lhat have become compelling in 
the relations between the parties. The developing countries see some 
unreality in the argument that because the effective date of the 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 18. 
114. Id. at 8. 
115. Id. at 16. 
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concessions is the date when "the Libyan law is frozen," subsequent 
changes in the Libyan national policy are therefore irrelevant, un-
less those changes are consented to by the corporations. Had the 
learned arbitrator considered the merits of any of those factors gen-
erally considered reasonable by the international community for 
purposes of characterizing what is equitable in the true nature of the 
contractual relationship, qua the initial terms of the contract be-
tween the parties, the policies appropriate for its renegotiation 
would have become clearer. 
The parties' failure to renegotiate the terms of their agreement 
in accordance with the changing conditions, and under the national 
legislation of the state, would then have become legitimate grounds 
for nationalization. Where the demands made by the state party are 
manifestly unreasonably, discriminatory, or unrealizable, then the 
act of nationalization may give rise to claims of international re-
sponsibility going beyond the monetary losses suffered by the par-
ties. The empirical content of "the international law system" would 
have been more clear than it is now. 
C. The Scope of the NIEO Concepts Concerning Permanent 
Sovereignty of States 
It remained to be seen how much of the present NIEO claims 
have significantly altered the meaning and scope of the doctrine of 
permanent sovereignty of states, and whether that change also al-
tered the meaning of the relevant principles of international law 
applicable here. The arbitrator limited his concern of the perma-
nent sovereignty principle to the limited issue he posed for the arbi-
tration in the first place; whether the Libyan decree breached the 
contractual obligations accepted by the parties. The arbitrator 
stated the issue in the following manner: 
[D]oes the act of sovereignty which constitutes the nationalization 
authorize a State to disregard its international commitments as-
sumed by it within the framework of its sovereignty? 116 
Further, by distinguishing the legal effects attributable to an act of 
nationalization at the international level between those situations 
where the state concerned has made no particular commitment to 
guarantee and protect foreign nationals or their interests, and the 
others where the state has concluded with a foreign enterprise "an 
internationalized agreement entered into directly under the aegis of 
116. Id. at 22. 
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international law," the arbitrator inferred the existence of an obliga-
tion on the part of the nationalizing state wider in scope and content 
than the obligation that would otherwise arise by the operation of 
the principles of diplomatic protection in international law. It al-
most amounts to the proposition that the sovereign right of states 
to nationalize is nonexistent when there exists a contractual com-
mitment, even when such a commitment is precisely the target of 
and reason for invoking the nationalization measures. 117 
It would be an entirely different argument to advance that 
when the unilateral acts of nationalization result in losses, the sov-
ereign state is under an obligation to compensate properly the losses 
suffered by the other party. Subject to the entailing international 
responsibility for compensation, the sovereign state party to a con-
cession agreement, has, just as the other party, the private corpora-
tion, comparable freedom if not greater liberty, to attempt to correct 
inequities which have become apparent during the course of the 
performance of the contract. Denying the state the capability to 
exercise its permanent sovereignty over all its natural wealth and 
economic activities by projecting an absolutist doctrine of pacta 
sunt servanda, obscures the true considerations germane for main-
taining the continued contractual relations between the parties. 
Such an interpretation has the effect of robbing the operational 
content of the norm, and denying to the recognized right of states 
competence to exercise their permanent sovereignty. It is not sur-
prising therefore that the arbitrator is compelled to offer a restric-
tive view of international customary law when confronted with the 
international practice pertaining to recent nationalizations: 
The fact that various nationalization measures in disregard of pre-
viously concluded agreements have been accepted in fact by those 
who were affected, either private companies or by the States of 
which they were nationals, cannot be interpreted as recognition by 
international practice of such a rule; the amicable settlements 
which have taken place having been inspired basically by considera-
tions of expediency and not of legality. Nothing prohibits the parties 
involved in a nationalization . . . from negotiating a new agreement 
leading to a new legal status. 118 
117. See id. 
118. Id. at 24. A typical approach to analysis of the practice in this regard is the view 
advocated by Mann, The Consequences of an International Wrong in International and 
Municipal Law, 68 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. l, 46-57 (1976-1977). After pointing out that in a 
January, 1977 publication of the International Chamber of Commerce, entitled Bilateral 
Treaties for International Investment, there were 141 treaties entered into between 1945 and 
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Not only the efforts to establish a NIEO loudly and clearly declare 
the purposes and policies governing nationalization, realization of 
the NIEO goals is viewed as dependent upon making changes in, 
and where beneficial, the termination of such concessionary ar-
rangements. Concessionary agreements spread over such long dura-
tions (a period of 50 years in the Libyan Deeds), involving the ex-
ploitation of the only natural resources upon which the economy and 
the development of the state depend, cannot be construed narrowly 
merely because the concession is accompanied by a stabilization 
clause. 
The precise nature and scope of what is thus frozen, or when 
and for what purposes the frozen status is warmed-up to serve the 
changing interests of the parties, are matters not limited exclusively 
to the context that, in the first place, permitted the parties to strike 
a bargain. It would be an unjustly rigid theory of contract law which 
insists upon performance of a contract in terms of a frozen context 
when the very context calling for the continued performance of the 
commitments is radically changed, not because of any acts of com-
mission or omission of one party, but by the developments in the 
market and global economies, especially when the latter have the 
effect of fundamentally changing the situation, making the perform-
ance of the commitments excessively onerous or burdensome. 
Nor is the argument advanced to reject the "oil concessions" as 
a special category of "public service concessions," on the theory that 
"[o]il concessions ... while remaining in the nature of acts gov-
erned by public law, have a confractual character which is much 
more designed to afford to operators who assume important eco-
nomic risks guarantees of greater stability," 1111 demonstrates a suffi-
cient degree of sensitivity to the emerging public policy concerns of 
states to regard energy, food, international travel, and similar other 
basic needs, as special areas for international regulation and protec-
tion. 
The arbitrator, on the other hand, appears to recognize that 
nationalization can, in certain circumstances, have the effect of 
1976, which by the operation of the Most-Fav.oured Nation Treatment, further expand the 
scope of their application, the author attacked the opinion that the actual practice obtaining 
in this regard is at variance from this treaty language: "The treaties . . . prove that the States 
contemplated by Rigaux and many of their supporters or defenders have a habit of being 
doubletoungued; their standard is not the law, but their interest." Id. at 47 n.6. This learned 
author is able to come to this conclusion by excluding, at the outset, whether the circumstan-
ces in which a taking of a foreigner's property is contrary (or ex hypothesis non-contrary) to 
public international law are, as outside the confines of his discussion. Id. at 46. 
119. Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, supra note 1, at 25 (citation omitted). 
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placing the nationalizing state "on a level outside of and superior 
to the contract and also to the international legal order itself'' which 
then "constitutes an 'act of government' ... which is beyond the 
scope of any judicial redress or any criticism." 1211 The subtle manner 
in which the "political question" argument is thus introduced into 
the discussion merely serves to gloss over the essentially critical 
function expected of third party decisionmakers. Not only do "Act 
of State" and "sovereign immunity" defences have no function to 
perform in commercial arrangements of this nature, failure to in-
quire into the appropriateness and reasonableness of a state's claim 
to nationalize the vital resource supply sources upon which its own 
economies and those of the global community depend, amounts to 
abdicating an essentially judicial function expected of such third-
party decisionmakers. 
There is perhaps a procedural difficulty for inquiring into a 
dispute on the above lines attributable to the failure of the parties 
to agree on a third-party procedure for settlement. The failure of 
Libya to appear before the arbitrator is appropriately viewed as an 
important factor here. But it is only one factor and, judging from 
the language of the award, it does not appear to have been a compel-
ling reason for the award rendered. The argument was cast in terms 
of whether the right to nationalize within the terms of the doctrine 
of permanent sovereignty of states was a standard of jus cogens. 
Even admitting that the right of permanent sovereignty of states 
has the character of jus cogens, its exercise via the system of conces-
sionary contract is quite acceptable. The analysis of this concept 
has been quite persuasively presented by the arbitrator. Referring 
to the concept of jus cogens he observed: 
It could only be a justification in those cases where a Government 
resorted to nationalization procedures in order to retract an effective 
alienation of its sovereignty to which it or one of its predecessors had 
agreed. But this is not-or at least this is not necessarily-the signif-
icance of a petroleum concession . . . . The notion of permanent 
sovereignty can be completely reconciled with the conclusion by a 
State of agreements which leave to that State control of the activi-
ties of the other contracting party. As regards the question of perma-
120. Id. This is the crux of the problem. Claims of "Act of State" on the ground that 
because existing norms of customary international law against unjust and arbitrary depriva-
tions of foreign interests are not "universally · accepted" are not political questions when 
presented before international decisionmakers. See R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS 
IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964); see the comment of McDougal and Jennings in 
The Aftermath of Sabbatino, 1975 REP. OF THE CITY OF N.Y. BR. OF THE AM. BAR Ass'N. 
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nent sovereignty, a well-known distinction should be made as to 
enjoyment and exercise. 
[T]he concept of jus cogens . . . should not apply to any treaty or 
contract simply because such treaty or contract concerns the exploi-
tation of natural resources; in each particular case, verification 
should be made as to whether the act considered does in fact alien-
ate the sovereignty of the State over such resources. 121 
These are quite persuasive considerations and must be examined 
carefully. Admittedly, the highly controversial concept ofjus cogens 
is not really germane to the claim that when a certain arrangement 
involving foreign collaboration is perceived to be resulting in inequi-
ties which could not be rectified through negotiation, exercising the 
option of termination is within the recognized competence of the 
parties, not limited to the state authorities alone. 
The inequities mentioned above need not be limited to the 
aggregate yields of profits, but may include some of the welfare 
objectives declared in the NIEO. For example, recognition of the 
needs of the developing countries to exercise complete control and 
ownership over the means of production and distribution of natural 
resources situated within their jurisdiction, including all economic 
activities related to them, has been accepted by all sides concerned. 
In recent practice, most direct foreign investment arrangements are 
made with the understanding that over a period of time they would 
be "phased out" in the sense that the host country would be placed 
in a position to exercise its complete control. Such phasing-out ar-
rangements, modern turn-key projects, joint ventures, and foreign 
investment arrangements all indicate the presence of a certain 
shared expectation that there will be a take-over of the concern 
sooner than later. Consequently, the doctrine of good faith which 
finds its expression in Chapter l(j) of the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States122 has its own special connotation con-
sidered in light of these emerging international economic rela-
tions.123 
The appropriate question, then, is not whether nationalization 
121. Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, supra note 1, at 26. 
122. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, 54, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). 
123. See Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, supra note 1, at 31 (quoting Ambassador 
Castaneda of Mexico). For a most persuasive analysis of this issue, see Stanford, International 
Law and Foreign Investment, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 471, 
486 (R. Macdonald, D. Johnston, & G. Morris ed. 1978). The fact that Mexico initiated the 
Charter and originally intended it to be a legally binding document underscores the value of 
the views of the Mexican Ambassador. 
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per se is, or is not, permissible; it may even be regarded as a most 
desirable objective from the point of view not only of the host state 
but the corporations as well. The fact that implementation of this 
goal, in so far as exploitation of natural resources in the extractive 
sector has been resisted by transnational corporations, has given rise 
to serious debates and disputes. 124 Most major controversies over 
nationalization have been in the extractive sector where the en-
trenched interests of the transnational giants are not easily recon-
ciled with the aspirations of the host states for their economic devel-
opment on equitable bases. To say this is not to suggest that such 
"wealth deprivations" are matters beyond the pale of international 
law. The interesting question then is, what principles of interna-
tional law govern such disputes? 
In appraising the scope of the "national legislation" standard 
employed in the Charter and other NIEO documents in place of the 
"international standard" mentioned in earlier resolutions, and gen-
erally claimed to be applicable for determining the lawfulness of 
nationalization measures, the award quotes prior arbitral decisions 
as evidence for the existence of a norm of customary international 
law. But, the fact remains, that since the Anglo-Iranian case, 125 the 
Sapphire,'26 ARAMCO, 127 and others,128 in virtually every nationali-
zation, the host country legislation provided for negotiations to de-
termine the amount of compensation payable to the companies in-
volved. Consequently, it is perhaps not so much the language of 
selected paragraphs in the various cases that reflects the state of 
customary international law as the actual practice, the nature of the 
settlements made, that provides the relevant evidence for inferring 
124. See generally R. CASAD & R. MONTAGUE, EXPROPRIATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND 
PANAMA-PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES (1975); Lillich, The Diplomatic Protection of Nationals 
Abroad: An Elementary Principle of International Law Under Attack, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 359 
(1975); Weston, International Law and the Deprivation of Foreign Wealth: A Framework for 
Future Inquiry, in 2 THE FUTURE or THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 36 (R. Falk & C. Black 
ed. 1970). For a comprehensive bibliography on this subject, see U.N. Secretariat: Nationali-
zation or Takeover of Foreign Enterprises, Select Bibliography, U.N. Doc. ST/Lib/35 (1974) . 
For a summary of nationalization measures reported in studies for the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, see U.S. Department of State Report on Nationalization, Expropriation, and 
other Takings of U.S. and Certain Foreign Property since 1960, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL 
MAT'LS 84 (1971); Expropriation of American-Owned Property by Foreign Governments in the 
Twentieth Century, reprinted in 2 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1066 (1963). 
125. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, l.C.J. Pleadings 268 (1952). 
126. Sapphire Int'l Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 35 l.L.R. 136 (1963). 
127. Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 27 l.L.R. 117 (1958). 
128. See Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, supra note 1, at 21-22 (evaluating the state 
of customary practice). See also The Compensation Requirement in the Taking of Alien 
Property, 22 N.Y.C. BAR Ass'N REP. 195 (1967). 
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the appropriate norms of international law. 1211 
If this interpretation of customary international law is correct 
then the actual practice of states provides an additional dimension 
relevant to a proper interpretation of the concept of "good faith." 
The fact that in most instances of recent nationalization the very 
same enterprises are able to collaborate with the host states in con-
tinuing the undertakings in question reinforce~ the function served 
by such third-party decisions. They play an important role in the 
post-nationalization negotiations relating to the terms of settle-
ment. They play only a marginal role in the development of the 
substantive norm of customary international law governing the 
principles either of the sanctity of contract or the scope of the mu-
nicipal law applicable for its interpretation and application. This 
also explains why it has been relatively easy for the parties in the 
Libyan-Oil Companies Arbitration case to negotiate a mutually ac-
ceptable settlement within five months of the arbitral award. 1:1° 
D. The Scope and Meaning of the "Appropriate Compensation" 
Principle in Light of the NIEO Declarations 
As noted earlier, the meaning and scope of the right of perma-
nent sovereignty of states over their natural resources and, the na-
ture of the legal obligations which the exercise of that right would 
entail are among the most severely contested elements in the pro-
posals relating to the establishment of a new international economic 
order. Article 2(2)(c) of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States has been claimed to epitomize the change brought about 
in the relevant principles of international law. 1:11 The arbitrator ex-
amined these provisions of the Charter and other United Nations 
Resolutions pertaining to NIEO, invoked by Libya in support of its 
nationalization, to determine whether these have changed the appl-
icable principles of international law. 
129. Raman, Toward a General Theory of International Customary Law, in TOWARD 
WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY (W. Reisman & B. Weston ed. 1975); Raman, The Role of 
Customary Practice in the Development of Universal International Law, in ASIAN STATES AND 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 212 (R. Anand ed. 1972); Raman, The 
Role of the International Court of Justice in the Development of International Customary 
Law, 1965 PROC. AM. Soc'v INT'L L. 169. 
130. From the information available on the terms of settlement negotiated by the two 
companies, it is not clear to what extent $152 million of Libyan crude oil over a period of 
fifteen months is in conformity with the legal rights of the concession holders endorsed by 
the arbitrator. Nor is there any clear evidence that the Libyan agreement to pay this compen-
sation is influenced by the arbitral award in any significant manner. 
131. See Adede, supra note 6; Brower & Tepe, supra note 6, at 304-09. 
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The customary practice on this subject quite clearly demon-
strates the existence of an obligation to pay compensation. i:12 The 
classical formula of Secretary Hull, invoked by the United States 
in its claims prior to the Charter of the United Nations, has not been 
shown accepted in later international practice. Indeed the Depart-
ment of State acknowledged in 1957 that "there are great variances 
among nations as to the degree to which they are prepared to bind 
themselves legally to accord fair treatment, even among those which 
in fact accord fair treatment in practice. " 133 General Assembly Reso-
lution 626(VII), 134 of 1952, entitled "Right to Exploit Freely Natural 
Wealth and Resources," was adopted with the negative vote of the 
developed countries because it failed to recognize the proprietory 
rights of private investors under international law. Resolution 1803 
(XVII), 135 adopted during 1962 recognized the demands of the devel-
oped industrialized countries and provided for payment of appropri-
ate compensation in accordance with international law. That reso-
lution was adopted by a vote of 87-2-12, with all twelve abstentions 
and negative views being those of countries of Eastern Europe. This 
situation was again changed when Resolution 2158(XXl) 1311 was 
adopted during 1966 by 104 in favour and the six industrialized 
countries abstaining, which has endorsed the general policies for 
promoting the participation of the host states in their foreign con-
trolled enterprises. The claim that General Assembly Resolutions 
3171(XXVIll) 137 of 1973 and 3281(XXIX), 1311 which contained the 
Economic Charter, reflect the consensus on the matter of compensa-
tion, is rejected by the arbitrator on the following grounds: 
In appraising the legal validity of the above-mentioned Resolutions 
this tribunal will take account of the criteria usually taken into 
consideration, i.e., the examination of voting conditions and the 
132. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 85, at 460-83 (survey of the most recent cases 
on this subject). 
133. Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program for Six Months Ended Dec. 
31, 1956, Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 
(1957) (statement of T. Kalijarvi). 
134. G.A. Res. 626, 7 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 18, U.N. Doc. N2361 (1962). 
135. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. N5217 (1962). 
136. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 2158, 21 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 16) 29, U.N. Doc. N6316 (1966). 
137. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 30A) 52, U.N. Doc. N9030 (1974). 
138. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. N9631 (1974). 
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analysis of the provisions concerned. 
[On] the occasion of the vote on a resolution finding the existence 
of a customary rule, the States concerned clearly express their 
views. The consensus by a majority of States belonging to the var-
ious representative groups indicates without the slightest doubt uni-
versal recognition of the rules therein incorporated, i.e., with respect 
to nationalization and compensation the use of the rules in force in 
the nationalizing State, but all this in conformity with international 
law.1a11 
It does not appear necessary here to dwell on the inconsistencies and 
confusions manifest in the use of terms such as "consensus" and 
"universal recognition" in one and the same breadth in the above 
statement. 140 According to the tribunal "the conditions under which 
Resolutions 3171 (XXVII), 3201 (S-VI) and 3281 (XXIX) ... [were 
adopted] were notably different." 141 The specific paragraph con-
cerning nationalizations in the above resolutions "disr-egarding the 
role of international law, not only was not consented to by the most 
important Western countries, but caused a number of the develop-
ing countries to abstain. " 142 
Having stated that the resolutions of the General Assembly are 
only of a recommendatory value and that "they must be accepted 
by the members of the United Nations in order to be legally bind-
ing," the arbitrator found Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 1962 as express-
ing "opinio juris communis," or "the expression of a real general 
will," whereas the later pronouncements, irrespective of the numeri-
cal majorities found in their favour, are not truly reflective of any 
consensus. 143 Why is this so? "In the first place, Article 2 of this 
Charter must be analysed as a political rather than as a legal decla-
ration concerned with the ideological strategy of development and, 
as such, supported only by nonindustrialized states." 144 This view 
has indeed quite far-reaching implications to the issue of how inter-
national law is created. Secondly, "the absence of any connection 
between the procedure of compensation and international law and 
the subjection of this procedure solely to municipal law cannot be 
regarded by this Tribunal except as a de lege ferenda formulation, 
139. Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, supra note 1, at 28, 30. 
140. Compare the views of Judges Dillard and de Castro in the Fisheries Jurisdiction 
Cases, [1974] l.C.J. 109; [1974] l.C.J. 125. 
141. Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, supra note 1, at 29. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 30. 
144. Id. 
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which even appears contra legem in the eyes of many developed 
countries." 145 Although the arbitrator quoted with approval the ex-
planations advanced by Ambassador Castaneda, which amply clar-
ify the continuing relevance of all prior resolutions mentioned in the 
preamble, and hence within the scope of international law, the re-
cent formulations of the principle of nationalization have been 
stated to be not acceptable. They compromise the contractual bal-
ance between the parties. "In law, such an outcome would go di-
rectly against the most elementary principle of good faith and for 
this reason it can not be accepted." 148 
Obviously, the foregoing statement of reasons advanced against 
the NIEO provisions deserves careful consideration. The assump-
tions that because national policies are not stated expressly to be 
subject to international law and therefore they would invariably be 
contrary to international law in all circumstances may not be war-
ranted. Such a contingency can nevertheless arise even when a refer-
ence to international law is included, where the nationalizing state 
claims that its conduct is not contrary to any established principle 
of international law, a principle established with the consent of all 
the representative interests thus affected. Not only is there some 
circularity in this argument, international doctrine has always rec-
ognized that even when a certain impugned conduct is governed 
exclusively by the municipal law of a state, when such actions have 
effects at the international level, they are subject to international 
law .147 
The function and effect of the third-party procedures for settle-
ment of disputes mentioned in Article 2(2)(c) of the Charter may 
not always prove to be a conclusive test or a proper element for 
determining the normative value of changes those provisions have 
brought in international law. The distinction that some law-
creating efforts are political, and hence they are suspect, betrays 
confusion. Prescription of international law is always a political act; 
it involves a choice of policy among competing policy options. Ap-
plication of international law calls for judicious appraisal and brings 
into question the reasonableness, appropriateness, and practical 
consequences of the choices made for relating a prescription to the 
conflicting claims in a context. 148 At the international level, the 
145. Id. (emphasis added). 
146. Id. at 31. 
147. See Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 132; H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 363-65 (1958). 
148. For an illuminating discussion of the different decision-functions, especially those 
of "prescription" and "application" of law, see M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, & J. MILLER, 
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application process also is not completely immune from political 
considerations, although there is a high degree of expectation that 
third-party decisionmakers, as objective policy-makers, are insu-
lated from "political considerations."149 
Why then do the majority of the developing countries deliber-
ately choose not to repeat the expressions referring to "international 
law" contained in the 1966 resolutions in their 1974 and 1975 
declarations? Why, after accepting the possibility of submitting 
their disputes to third-party settlement procedures, did they insist 
on the necessity for "mutual agreement" in the choice of a forum 
for such settlement? Would they have agreed on a provision, auto-
matically conferring jursidiction on a forum, if the Charter was 
drafted in a treaty form open for acceptance and ratification? Has 
not this latter point something to do with the views expressed by 
the Group of 77 that the Charter is only an element in the process 
of law-making, rather than a final treaty, but not so much to do with 
the question whether or not the Charter is also a law-making effort 
in that direction? 
Questions such as these must be raised and answered, not in a 
confrontational jargon of a court dialect, but in a constructive spirit 
of real concern with the interdependent interests of both the devel-
oping and the developed countries. The fact that that is precisely 
what usually transpires during the negotiations for settlement of 
compensation claims, as Oscar Schachter has pointed out, throws 
into sharp relief many of these polemical arguments. 150 
E. Appraisal of the Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration 
One should approach, with considerable circumspection, the 
task of evaluating the possible impact on the NIEO of the various 
observations contained in the opinion of the sole arbitrator in the 
Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration. There is no doubt that the 
Arbitration will influence the attitude of both developing and the 
developed countries. The doctrine and jurisprudence of interna-
tional law has been considerably enriched by the lucid analysis of 
INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 206, 258-62 (1967) . 
149. Id. at 360-69. 
150. Schachter, supra note 4, at 8. See 0. SCHACHTER, supra note 4; Bourquin, 
Arbitration and Economic Development Agreements, 15 Bus. LAW. 860 (1960); Hyde, 
Economic Development Agreements, 105 RECUEIL DES Couas 267 (1962); Onejeme, supra note 
80; Schmidt, Arbitration Under the Auspices of the International Centre for the Settlement 
of Disputes (ICSID): Implications of the Decision on Jurisdiction in Alcoa Minerals of Ja-
maica, Inc. v. Government of Jamaica. 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 90 (1976); Smith & Wells, Conflict 
Avoidance in Concession Agreements, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 51 (1976). 
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the learned arbitrator, especially on the issues of customary interna-
tional law and the authority of United Nations resolutions. Its direct 
impact on the current NIEO debates does not, however, appear 
quite so clear. 
For example, it will be difficult to assess the importance of the 
findings in the Arbitration relating to the legal issues of nationaliza-
tion and compensation in the absence of a properly argued brief for 
the respondents. The Libyan reply to the Registrar of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, rejecting the arbitral procedure of the con-
cessions to submit to third-party arbitration, has not been made 
public. It · is not quite clear whether the Libyan objections referred 
to the "existence of a dispute" in the sense in which it is used in 
the contracts, or to the final obligation to accept a third-party set-
tlement procedure. 
Even if we assume that the objections are not of a procedural 
character, there is still considerable doubt whether this arbitral 
opinion, which has found that the obligations of the government 
under the Deeds of Concession continue to be valid, has in any way 
strengthened or influenced the subsequent settlement negotiations. 
Because the parties have been able to negotiate the terms of their 
settlement, as it appears, independently of any third-party pres-
ence, the arbitrator has not been called upon to resolve what com-
pensation or damages accrue to the plaintiffs that were in the first 
place denied by the respondent. 
Even the so-called restitutio in integrum as a solution, is hardly 
a major achievement when one considers that the payment in kind 
to the value of a negotiated sum, according to the increased price 
of oil, is not in any true sense reparation or damages for the termina-
tion of the contracts accomplished by the impugned act of nationali-
zation. Such would have been the case if Libya had rejected totally 
any compensation in the first place; on the substantive plane the 
focus of the arbitration is so innocuously limited to a finding, as 
though that is in doubt, whether the Libyan act of nationalization 
violated the commitments made by Libya, the arbitrator did not 
inquire into the legality or otherwise of the justifications adduced 
for their termination. As a matter of fact, if Libya had appeared 
before the tribunal, or if the sovereign right of Libya to embark upon 
nationalization is in itself the subject matter of inquiry, then the 
arbitrator would have been compelled to adjudge the lawfulness of 
the two claims advanced by Libya and rejected by the corporations, 
viz.: (1) the newly imposed quantitative production controls reduc-
ing the supply of crude oil to nearly half of the existing levels, and 
55
Raman: Transnational Corporations & NIEO
Published by SURFACE, 1978
72 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol.6:17 
(2) the quadrupling of the price of oil again unilaterally determined 
by the sovereign state accompanied by other restrictions imposed 
concerning the destination of its resource. On both of these issues 
the claims were not before the arbitrator; nor did the arbitrator 
consider them either explicitly or by implication in his analysis of 
the scope of the sovereign right of a state to carry the measures of 
nationalization. 
Indeed, by 1977, the date of the arbitral award, considerable 
public debate on the issue· of the lawfulness of economic coercion, 
outside the authority of the Security Council of the United Nations, 
has raised interesting questions whether the OPEC countries' use of 
the oil cartel for the political purpose of securing their objectives in 
the Middle East conflict with Israel, is a lawful or reasonable exer-
cise of their individual and collective right of self defence under 
international law .151 Undoubtedly these are "political arguments," 
but on that account alone they cannot be regarded as outside of the 
concern of international law, any more than nationalization itself, 
which is also a political act on the part of the sovereign state. Conse-
quently, for these and similar other reasons, the arbitral award, 
though very cogently argued, appears to have only marginal relev-
ance to the continuing debate on the future course of a New Interna-
tional Economic Order. 
VI. THE TASK AHEAD 
What is the status of the legal principles concerning foreign 
investment disputes today? On the one hand, the traditional formu-
lations on this subject have been considerably changed by the 1962 
United Nations resolution, 152 cited with approval as reflecting the 
current international law on the subject. Between the Sapphire and 
the Libya-Oil Companies arbitral awards, there is a considerable 
body of jurisprudence and practice that has accumulated, which 
may even appear to be supporting many of the formulations of the 
1962 United Nations resolution. The NIEO formulations of 1974-76 
on those very same principles have been rejected by one side and 
vigorously championed by the other. The differences are not just on 
the verbal plane. 
The NIEO recognizes the scope of the permanent sovereignty 
concept to include not only the activities over the resources in situ, 
151. See Shibata, supra note 6. 
152. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. N5217 (1962). 
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but all economic activities of foreign corporations related to such 
resources. So much so, the interests which the developing countries 
seek to control through domestic legislation including, where neces-
sary, by outright nationalization, embrace many of the business and 
trade practices of transnational corporations; the factors giving rise 
to a dispute in the interpretation and application of an international 
commercial agreement, including concessionary contracts, are too 
many and varied in character, all subsumed under the amorphous 
notion of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 
Tax computation, adequate technology inputs, indexation of 
prices, quality control, production quotas, transfer pricing mecha-
nisms, consultancy fees, marketing arrangements and destination 
controls, to name only a few, are all matters intimately related to 
the performance of an international resource development agree-
ment. To assume that somehow "the doctrine of good faith" can 
resolve all such issues in a manner satisfactory to both the develop-
ing countries, concerned with making economic progress, and the 
multinational corporations, whose only interest is in making profits 
to stay in business, is to ignore the complexities of modern trade and 
commerce. International law must grapple with these nuances and 
clarify the policies which meet the common interests of both sides. 
Finally, nothing is gained by the acrimonious debate whether 
international law remains or is abandoned as a yardstick for deter-
mining the reasonableness of claims in dispute in respect of NIEO 
matters. The Libya-Oil Companies award amply demonstrated the 
impermissibility of any arguments that international law is not rele-
vant, even when a municipal legislation seeking nationalization is 
patently unjust or arbitrary in character. There is nothing in the 
NIEO formulations to indicate that such an extreme view is either 
intended or invariably the consequence of those formulations. 
On the contrary, the NIEO documents, for reasons mentioned 
above, have rejected the applicability of the traditional concepts of 
international law. Their proponents reject the contention that the 
global economic policies, designed to promote their rapid economic 
development, should continue to be judged by an international law 
whose meaning and content is clearly antithetical to those aims and 
aspirations. In this respect, the practice of not subjecting to existing 
international law standards, or to third-party settlement procedures 
wedded to those standards, is scarcely confined to developing coun-
tries.153 The important question here is not whether international 
153. See note 147 supra. Interesting questions arise when one considers the competence 
of individual states to change, by their unilateral acts, general international law of customary 
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law is applicable, but whether the changes in the economic develop-
ment policies sought to be made (on which there is, indeed, consen-
sus among the developed and the developing states) are treated as 
part of the corpus of international law. The reticence of states initi-
ating changes in international law from submitting their disputes 
to third-party settlement procedures reflects, perhaps, their deep-
seated, but not completely misplaced, mistrust of the authority and 
enlightenment of such procedures. 
The efforts underway to restructure the world economic system, 
both within and outside the United Nations forums, are not limited 
to making some structural adjustments to tackle specific issues of 
particular interest only to some sectors of world economy. The aim 
of the NIEO is to bring about fundamental changes in the policies 
and practices governing the generation, distribution, and enjoyment 
of global wealth. The perceptions of the industrialized and the de-
veloping states as to what NIEO is all about are at odds. For the 
great majority of the states their development needs are capital, 
technology, and access to markets. For the industrialized states 
their needs are security, protection of foreign investment, and free 
access to the raw materials. International law can play a useful role 
in harmonizing and promoting the interests of both sides. The de-
veloping countries have identified a number of areas in which infor-
mational and servicing functions on a regular basis can serve to 
promote TNCs transparency, train them in the skills of contract 
negotiation, and offer realistic assessments of what is available for 
trading, bartering, and collectively promoting, in order to facilitate 
growth and enjoyment of goods and services across national and 
cultural frontiers. 
Perceptions of changing customary international law can be 
integrated into policy and be reflected in the analysis of decision-
makers. There is really no need to confuse between the "is" and the 
"ought" under the guise of some unspecified theories of customary 
international law. The fact is that international law, in this vital 
character and how this individual competence is accounted for when a group of such states 
in common interest attempt to change that very same customary international law through 
concerted action, albeit through majority views and declarations. See Statement of Ambassa-
dor Elliot Richardson, Before the Resumed Seventh Session of the Law of the Sea Conference, 
U.S.l.S. Information Release 78-15 (Sept. 1978); Henkin, Arctic Anti-Pollution: Does Canada 
Make-or Break-International Law?, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1971). 
Such examples may be multiplied at will, but the point remains, it is not the modality 
by which claims not to be bound by extant prescriptions are made, but for what purposes, in 
what contexts, and with what consequences external decisionmakers should respond to such 
claims. 
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area of mutual interest to both the developing and the developed 
economy states, is considerably altered, albeit strengthened, despite 
claims of incompatibility on the verbal plane. 
For example, Joseph Stanford, in his perceptive analysis of 
current foreign investment practices, comes to the following sober 
conclusion: 
The need for investment capital will remain, however, and even if 
significantly diminished will continue to be, potentially at least, a 
major tool at the disposal of development planners in the developing 
countries. The extent to which this tool is used will depend largely 
upon whether the commercial motives of the investor are perceived, 
by either side, as inconsistent with the sovereignty and development 
objectives of the host country. There is no inherent reason why these 
two objectives should be inconsistent. It is for the investors and the 
development planners to devise investment arrangements which 
respond to both objectives. If they are successful, bilateral state 
practice will generate a new body of customary international law 
respecting both the sovereignty of the host state and the legitimate 
interests of the investor. 154 
Commenting on the impasse in the North/South dialogue in 
Paris, and the deadlock reached in the recent Committee of the 
whole of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Ambassador 
Donald Mills summed up the task ahead thus: 
We are not trying to build a world that is just a place that will look 
after the interests of developing countries. We are trying to contrib-
ute to the building of a world which will be a better place for every-
body . . . . It will be a world that will be somewhat different from 
the one that history bequeathed us, in which a few countries domi-
nate the rest of the world. This situation has ended. The future will 
not go in that direction. So if we want to build an equitable world 
in which we can all share and create a satisfied global population, 
then join us now. Don't run the risk of leaving it to drift, because 
drifting is to invite disaster for all of us. 155 
154. Stanford, supra note 123, at 493. The trend, in direct foreign investment in 
the basic extractive sectors, such as petroleum, toward the elimination of TNCs, is pointed 
out by Michael Tanzer. 1978 NATURAL RESOURCES FORUM 121. See also Lipton, Fiscal Aspects 
of Negotiating Third World Mineral Development Agreements, 260 TRANSACTIONS or THE 
Soc'v OF MINING ENGINEERS 56-62 (1976) (pointing out the trend toward more sophisticated 
types of contractual arrangements); Smallbone, Mineral Exploration and Exploita-
tion-Proposals for a Fiscal Regime, COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, Feb. 1977. 
155. Blocked on the Way Around the Block, 6 DEVELOPMENT FORUM 7 (Oct. 1978) (inter-
view with Ambassadors Donald Mills and Manuel Perez-Guerrero). Some limited options in 
this respect have been projected in Farer, The United States and the Third World-A Basis 
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It is a challenge from which international lawyers can ill afford 
to remain aloof, or hold from lending their authority, until all the 
pieces of the puzzle are well in place. 
for Accommodation, 54 FOREIGN AFr. 79 (1975), which do not take into account the wide range 
of the Third World demands outlined in this essay. See also Statement by Mr. Idriss Jazairy, 
Chairman of the Committee Established Under G.A. Res. 32/174, U.N. Doc. OPI/CESI 
Note/467 (May 1978). 
60
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 6, No. 1 [1978], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol6/iss1/3
